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Regulation by Hypothetical 
 
Mehrsa Baradaran* 
A new paradigm is afoot in banking regulation—and it involves a turn 
toward the more speculative. Previous regulatory instruments have included 
geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, disclosure mandates, capital 
requirements, and risk management oversight to ensure the safety of the 
banking system. This Article describes and contextualizes these regulatory 
tools and shows how and why they were formed to deal with industry change. 
The financial crisis of 2008 exposed the shortcomings in each of these regimes. 
In important ways, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) departs from these past regimes and proposes something 
new: Call it “Regulation by Hypothetical.” 
Regulation by hypothetical refers to rules duly promulgated under 
appropriate statutory and regulatory mechanisms that require banks and their 
regulators today to make predictions about sources of crisis and weakness 
tomorrow. Those predictions—which, by their very definition, are conjectural 
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and speculative, even hypothetical—then become the basis of the use of the 
state’s regulatory power. This Article discusses two prominent instances of 
regulation by hypothetical: stress tests and living wills. It then discusses the 
strengths and weaknesses of such a regime and describes how the reliance on 
regulation by hypothetical can exacerbate the practice of government 
sponsorship of private financial risk taking. The Article then provides a 
solution that would strengthen this regime: using financial war games to 
increase the predictive value of the hypothetical scenarios. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The history of banking regulation in the United States 
resembles a cat-and-mouse game of industry change followed by 
regulatory response. Often, a crisis or industry innovation leads to a 
new regulatory regime. Regulatory initiatives have included 
geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, disclosure mandates, 
capital requirements, and risk management rules.1 The recently 
enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), which was a response to the recent financial 
crisis, introduces yet another strain of banking industry supervision: 
regulation by hypothetical. Regulation by hypothetical refers to rules 
that require banks today to make predictions about crises and 
weaknesses tomorrow. Those predictions—which, by definition, are 
speculative—then become the basis for regulatory intervention. 
This Article discusses two prominent instances of regulation by 
hypothetical: stress tests and living wills. Both of these forms of 
regulation were codified in Dodd-Frank, and they are two of the pillars 
supporting Dodd-Frank’s attempt to manage risk in systemically 
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).2 This Article will examine 
both the origins and the evolution of these reforms. It will also discuss 
the strengths and weaknesses of regulation by hypothetical and 
describe how reliance on this regulatory tool can exacerbate 
governmental sponsorship of private financial risk taking. Ultimately, 
 1.  Most of these initiatives followed the banking industry’s growth after the Great 
Depression. See infra Part II. 
 2.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (d) & (i) (2012). 
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this Article concludes that the regulation by hypothetical regime must 
be either abandoned or strengthened because its current form has 
significant flaws. 
Regulation by hypothetical adopts and extends the risk 
management framework used by firms for decades. That framework 
uses mathematical models to capture risk exposure in an increasingly 
complex financial landscape. What distinguishes regulation by 
hypothetical from prior risk management practices is that banks now 
must adhere to a governmentally imposed system of regulation that is 
both derived from and centered on hypothetical risk modeling.3 
The motivations of regulation by hypothetical are contagion 
containment, prophylaxis, and building partnerships between public 
regulators and private institutions to stay ahead of crises before they 
develop.4 Part of the reason the risk management regime failed is that 
individual firm models could not account for scenarios that might 
cripple the entire financial market and cause systemic risk, such as a 
nationwide decline in housing prices.5 In theory, regulation by 
hypothetical addresses this problem by streamlining risk modeling 
and bringing it in-house to banking regulators, specifically the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve (“FRB”). This new top-down risk 
modeling structure assures that systemic risk will be detected more 
easily, addressed more consistently, and modeled more rigorously than 
by shortsighted and insular private firms.6 In sum, Dodd-Frank 
endorses this risk management regime, mandates adherence to it, and 
enlarges the government’s role in its implementation. 
There are three significant problems with regulation by 
hypothetical as it is currently envisioned and practiced through stress 
testing and living wills. First, most scholars and regulatory bodies 
have concluded that risk management led by banks was a failure.7 If 
the risk management framework failed, as some say, because firms did 
not consider risks that were severe enough, then hypothetical 
regulation could provide an antidote by compelling banks to consider 
more severe scenarios of economic failure. However, if the risk 
management regime failed because it was based on a faulty premise 
 3.  See infra Part III. 
 4.  For more on the way that Dodd-Frank entrenches a public-private partnership, see 
DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS 
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 79 (2011).  
 5.  Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Why Banks Failed the 
Stress Test, Address at the Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress-Testing (Feb. 9–10, 2009), 
available at www.bis.org/review/r090219d.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X3YR-5AKK. 
 6.  See infra Part III.A. 
 7.  See infra Part III.A. 
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that it is possible to imagine and prepare for every adverse scenario 
that might affect a firm in the future, then any regulations relying on 
hypotheticals are doomed from the start. In other words, insofar as the 
risk management regime was predicated on the assumption that 
modeling for risk was an effective way of containing it, and the regime 
failed to account for unprecedented events (such as a nationwide 
plummeting of housing prices), the hypothetical regime is similarly 
limited. Ex ante hypotheticals are inherently unable to account for 
unprecedented events.8 Regulations based on hypotheticals are thus 
built on a precarious foundation. 
Second, the FRB, the creator and administrator of mandated 
hypothetical testing, comes to the project with a conflict of interest.9 
The FRB has always been a systemic risk regulator, and Dodd-Frank 
emphasizes and strengthens that function of the FRB.10 But the FRB 
is also tasked with ensuring calm and vibrant markets.11 Therefore, if 
the FRB creates a stress test that is too difficult and firms are not able 
to withstand the pressure, markets may panic. On the other hand, if 
the FRB creates a “soft” stress test in order to reassure markets about 
bank safety, systemic risks may well go unaddressed.12 This is not a 
theoretical problem. It was apparent during the first round of stress 
testing in 2009 that the FRB was more interested in calming 
markets.13 As a result, many knowledgeable observers accused the 
FRB of conducting a very light stress test and giving all of the firms a 
 8.  See infra Part III.D.1. 
 9.  This specific conflict only applies to stress testing. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation administers living wills. 
 10.  Dodd-Frank strengthens the Federal Reserve’s role as systemic risk regulator not only 
through mandated stress testing, but also through the creation of the Federal Systemic Oversight 
Counsel. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5333 (2012). 
 11.  See THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS (9th ed. 2005), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/98F-E3UV (stating 
that the Federal Reserve should seek "to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” because “when prices are stable . . . the 
prices of goods, services, materials and labor . . . serve as clearer signals and guides to the efficient 
allocation of resources and thus contribute to a higher standard of living.”); What is the Purpose 
of the Federal Reserve System?, THE FEDERAL RESERVE (Feb. 4, 2014), http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12594.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/RPZ9-U85Z (stating 
that the purpose of the Federal Reserve is “[m]aintaining the stability of the financial system and 
containing systemic risk that may arise in financial markets.”). 
 12.  Mark S. Copelovitch & David A. Singer, Financial Regulation, Monetary Policy, and 
Inflation in the Industrialized, World 70 J. POL. 663 (2008) ??????????????????????????????????????
in 23 industrial ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
countries with central banks that are vested with bank regulatory responsibility.”). 
 13.  See infra Part III.D.1.a. 
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clean bill of health.14 The FRB then publicized the results, which 
predictably caused a boost in the stock prices of the stress-tested 
banks, as well as a general surge of market confidence.15 
This market effect of regulator-conducted stress testing leads 
to the third problem with regulating by hypothetical, which focuses on 
the flip side of the FRB conflict. When the government conducts what 
it claims to be a rigorous stress test of a bank and then gives that bank 
a clean bill of health, the market receives a signal not only that the 
bank’s risks are well managed but also that the government itself will 
stand behind the bank if the assessment proves incorrect. Whereas 
individual firms used faulty risk management modeling in the pre-
Dodd-Frank era to inform their investment strategies, regulation by 
hypothetical has a game-changing quality. Regulators are now using 
models to reassure markets of firm strength, thereby providing a 
stamp of approval that could lead to unjustifiable reliance by markets. 
The federal government has already been accused of oversubsidizing 
large banks by providing below-market funding, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) insurance, and implicit bailout 
protection of firms deemed too big to fail (“TBTF”).16 This new regime 
creates another federal subsidy to the largest banks—a market signal 
that certifies the health of these firms. If the hypotheticals were 
accurate and the stress testing rigorous, this might not be that 
troublesome. But as this paper demonstrates, these hypothetical tests 
are not accurate barometers of bank health. In fact, the regulatory 
stamp of approval more likely has the effect of lulling markets into 
complacency and suppressing more rigorous analysis of the largest 
firms. It may also increase the likelihood of these firms being bailed 
out again in the event of a disaster because counterparties can claim 
that reliance on FRB pronouncements led them to invest in unsafe 
banks. In the end, regulation by hypothetical functions as an implicit 
guarantee by regulatory bodies of the largest banks. This guarantee, 
based on limited hypothetical scenarios, gives rise to perhaps the most 
troubling aspect of regulation by hypothetical. 
Thus, regulating by hypothetical and its problematic market 
signaling further entrenches a flawed partnership of the nation’s 
banks with the federal government. If regulators are going to continue 
 14.  See infra Part III.D.1.a. 
 15.  See infra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See infra Parts II.F.1 & III.D.1.c; see also Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, 
Caution, and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 765, 827–31 (2012) (detailing various public subsidies); Ann Graham, Bringing to Hell the 
Elephants in the Economy: The Case for Ending “Too Big to Fail,” 8 PIERCE L. REV. 117, 118 
(2010) (identifying specific banks that are “too big to fail,” and describing their characteristics). 
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to mandate hypothetical regulation, they must insist on aggressive 
risk modeling. One such tool would involve borrowing from military 
war game modeling to accurately predict crisis responses. The military 
has long engaged in “war games,” or realistic simulations of a potential 
conflict, to prepare themselves for the actual military event. The 
premise of military war games is that the best way to prepare for the 
unknowns of war is to practice responses to different possible 
scenarios. The current hypotheticals only look at balance sheets at a 
static point in time and do not attempt to predict how firm 
management might react to specific market events.17 For example, in 
predicting systemic risk, it would be relevant to know whether a fund 
manager faced with a stock market loss would try to prevent further 
loss, double down on risk in order to try to recuperate losses, or attempt 
to hedge to account for the loss. All of these responses would implicate 
different parts of the financial market as well as different 
counterparties. An accurate war game scenario accounts for all of these 
possibilities.18 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers a brief survey of 
financial regulation generally, describing the broad policy goals of 
financial and banking regulation since the Great Depression in order 
to provide context for the regulation by hypothetical regime. Part III 
explains regulation by hypothetical as a creation of Dodd-Frank and 
explains in greater detail stress tests and living wills as instances of 
such regulation. Part III also describes the inherent weaknesses of 
these forms of regulation, including the ways in which hypothetical 
financial regulation offers an implicit governmental guarantee against 
risks not covered by such hypotheticals. Part IV then discusses how 
hypothetical financial regulation can be improved. Specifically, Part IV 
suggests modeling financial war games, in keeping with practices long 
followed by military and intelligence regimes. 
II. FINANCIAL REGULATION SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
Bank regulation since the Great Depression has taken five 
major forms: geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, capital or 
equity requirements, disclosure mandates, and risk management 
oversight. These regimes have been employed successively and in 
tandem to combat new problems and to make use of technological 
 17.  Robert F. Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2260–68 (describing static risk models and the potential application of war 
games). 
 18.  Id. at 2263–66. 
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innovation in modernizing regulatory tools. This Part will briefly 
outline the strains of banking regulation since the Great Depression. 
This historical account highlights that banking regulation has 
undergone significant change in the last one hundred years. It also 
reveals how banking regulation gradually responded to new 
developments in the industry. Today, once again, the banking industry 
is facing transformative change. And, as in the past, major shifts in 
bank regulation are in the offing. Many industry analysts wish to 
revive old forms of regulation, while others advocate novel approaches 
to address new risks posed by an increasingly complex banking 
environment. Layered on top of this debate is Dodd-Frank, which has 
put in place a new strain of banking regulation: regulation by 
hypothetical. While other forms of banking regulation have been 
reexamined, regulation by hypothetical is a new form of government 
control that has been added to the mix of regulatory tools. It remains 
to be seen how prominent a role these new forms of regulation will play 
in both the near- and long-term. But one thing is certain: regulation by 
hypothetical—like past approaches to bank regulation—raises 
profound questions about the proper mix of private and public power 
in the financial industry. Table 1 identifies and briefly describes the 
six key forms of bank regulation: 
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These different forms of regulation have marked particular 
historical periods, as Figure 1 indicates: 
Figure 1: Timeline of Regulatory Regimes 
 
These different forms of regulation arose in different periods as 
a result of major changes in the banking industry. The remainder of 
this Part recounts the impetus behind each regulatory device, thus 
setting the stage for a close look at recent changes in the banking 
industry and the resulting emergence of regulation by hypothetical. 
A. Geographic Restrictions 
In the United States, bank branching across state lines is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Unit banking, or single-branch 
banking, was one of the major tenets of early banking regulation.21 
Banks were permitted to operate only out of a single branch so as to 
prohibit concentrations of power. But this approach also caused 
inefficiencies by impeding economies of scale; in addition, banks were 
unable to protect against risk through diversification because each 
institution’s fate was tied to the economic condition of a single region.22 
Eventually, banks were permitted to merge with other branches in 
order to move their funds efficiently across regions.23 However, even 
then, banks, including national banks, were prohibited from crossing 
 21.  Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 
221, 231 (2000).  
  22.  Id. at 232.  
  23.  FED. COMM. ON BRANCH, GRP. & CHAIN BANKING, BRANCH BANKING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (1930), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20 
history/frcom_br_gp_ch_banking/branch_banking_us.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8FWZ-
8N5A.  
201320091994198019701933
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Geographic Restrictions
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state lines.24 This prohibition was lifted in 1994 through the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Branching Act.25 
The justification for geographic restrictions hearkens back to 
the views that marked the founding era, including those of Thomas 
Jefferson. Jefferson and others deeply feared excessive power and 
concentration in banking.26 They worried that, if banks became too 
large, then the money centers—such as New York, Philadelphia, and 
Boston—would endanger America’s budding democratic movement, 
which had its roots in local civic engagement.27 Unit banking, which 
prohibits banks to have more than one branch, was thus entrenched in 
banking regulation from its start and proved difficult to lift for nearly 
a century.28 
These restrictions were gradually weakened due to 
industrialization forces and economic pressure. The Great Depression 
dealt the first blow to geographic restrictions. Many small, rural banks 
failed as the nation became more urban and as agricultural 
strongholds were weakened.29 The McFadden Act, passed in 1927, 
allowed banks to branch within state lines so that rural banks could 
 24. Randall S. Kroszner, The Motivations Behind Banking Reform, 24 REGULATION 36, 37 
(2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=272796, archived at 
http://perma.cc/CEY7-SKQ2. 
 25.  Id.  
 26. John S. Gordon, A Short Banking History of the United States, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 
2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122360636585322023.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
A8GP-WS5H. 
 27.  Thomas Jefferson once observed:  
Can it be thought that the Constitution intended that for a shade or two of 
convenience, more or less, Congress should be authorized to break down the most 
ancient and fundamental laws of the several States . . . . Nothing but a necessity 
invincible by any other means, can justify such a prostitution of laws, which constitute 
the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence. 
Jefferson's Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank: 1791, YALE LAW SCHOOL, LILLIAN 
GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bank-tj.asp, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/YLJ3-A6UT (last visited Sept. 25, 2014). 
 28.  Once expectations were set, banks in smaller regions fought hard to keep geographic 
restrictions intact so they could compete against bigger city banks, which had greater access to 
funds and a greater ability to branch. The arguments for continuing geographic restrictions 
focused on the practical problems caused by excessive concentrations in banking, such as 
“reduced competition, impaired service quality, increased price, driving out local firms, 
disadvantaging local areas, enabling a few large banks to amass inordinate economic power; 
reducing local control over banking, politicizing the banking system, and heightening pressure to 
bail out big banks that get into trouble.” RICHARD S. CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY 
P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 178 (4th ed. 2008). 
 29.  See David C. Wheelock, Regulation, Market Structure, and the Bank Failures of the 
Great Depression, 77 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 27, 30 (1995), available at https:// 
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/95/03/Regulation_Mar_Apr1995.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/W5BZ-6AX9. 
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diversify their holdings.30 These limits continued until advanced 
technology again made them unsustainable. The final blow to 
geographic restrictions was in 1994, after many years of banks trying 
to circumvent the rules. The ATM was introduced in the United States 
in the 1970s, which made it possible for bank customers to perform 
transactions regardless of their bank’s location.31 This innovation 
coupled with increased bank mergers in the 1980s and 1990s led 
policymakers to lift these now-outdated restrictions. The resulting 
Riegle-Neal Act32 was not forward thinking, but rather a reaction to 
pressure from the industry and a recognition of the changing face of 
banking. Banks needed to branch nationwide in order to exploit 
economies of scale and allocate their resources efficiently by 
diversifying their lending and deposit activities. 
B. Activity Restrictions 
The National Bank Acts (“NBA”)33 of 1863 and 1864 included 
the first set of nationally mandated activity restrictions. One such 
restriction limited bank activities to those “incidental powers as shall 
be necessary to carry on the business of banking,”34 thus keeping banks 
 30.  ABC’s of Banking: Lesson Five, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF BANKING, 
http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2235&q=297892, archived at http:// perma.cc/ZUL3-4E52 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2014). 
 31.  Kim Zetter, Sept. 2, 1969: First U.S. ATM Starts Doling Out Dollars, WIRED (Sept. 2, 
2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2010/09/0902first-us-atm/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QY9K-PEG7. 
 32.  See Joseph N. Heiney, Consolidation in the U.S. Banking Industry since Riegel-Neal, 9 
J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 71, 71 (2011). 
 33.  Regulation in the early days of banking was primarily a state matter. It consisted 
mostly of charter restrictions—with states trying to keep unscrupulous individuals out of the 
banking business. The NBA created a national banking system as well as a federal bank 
regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) to regulate them. The purpose 
of the first NBA and the newly formed national banks was to create a national currency that 
would help the government fund the Civil War. The purpose of the second NBA was to create 
federally chartered banks that would operate in addition to the banks chartered by the states. 
See Matthew Jaremski, State Banks and the National Banking Acts: A Tale of Creative 
Destruction, 45 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 379, 384 (2013); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: A SHORT HISTORY 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/history/OCC%20history%20final.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/5B88-28R6 (explaining that, while the second NBA permitted both the chartering of 
new banks and the conversion of state banks into national ones, the first Comptroller of the 
Currency “gave preference to the latter, convinced that experienced bank managers were 
essential to the system’s success”). 
 34. Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has it Lived its Life?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 
1, 48 (1993) (quoting National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988)). 
1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/7/2014 12:15 PM
2014] REGULATION BY HYPOTHETICAL 1259 
from engaging in commercial activities.35 The Glass-Steagall Act, a 
follow-up to the NBA, enforced comprehensive activity restrictions on 
all national banks. The centerpiece of post–Great Depression reform 
was the Glass-Steagall Act,36 which prohibited banks from engaging in 
a wide array of activities while also imposing interest rate caps and 
lending limits.37 These reforms separated riskier banking activities 
(securities and insurance underwriting and propriety trading) from 
traditional banking activity (deposit taking and lending) and 
permitted banks to engage in only the latter. 
In order to understand the need for activity restrictions, it is 
important to understand the problems they were meant to address. 
The central problem in banking was the prevalence of bank failures 
and irrational runs. Often, banks viewed as overly risky were punished 
by crude market discipline in the form of depositor runs.38 But runs 
were painful, imprecise, and, more importantly, inefficient: often 
healthy banks that were perceived as unhealthy, either through 
association or rumor, would also be exposed to customer runs.39 And 
although many states had deposit insurance funds, the funds often 
could not support large bank failures.40 
The inception of federal deposit insurance after the Great 
Depression ended bank runs but introduced a major moral hazard 
problem: because the insurance system shielded banks from market 
punishment and catastrophic failure, it incentivized banks to take on 
greater risks. With the initiation of the FDIC insurance fund, top-down 
 35. Id. The NBA also imposed credit limits and capital requirements—a bank could not lend 
more than ten percent of its capital to any one customer. William B. Glidden, National Bank 
Limits and the Comptroller’s Regs: A Clarification, 101 BANKING L.J. 430, 430 (1984). The Act 
also required banks to maintain cash reserves at federally specified levels. Bruce L. Rockwood, 
Interstate Banking and Nonbanking in America: A New Recipe for an Old Prescription or Why 
Does the Elephant Banker Wear Tennis Shoes and Water Wings, and Carry an Economist Pocket 
Diary?,12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 137, 149 (1989). The acts also created geographic restrictions for 
banks that mostly mirrored those provided by the states. Jeffrey D. Dunn, Expansion of National 
Bank Powers: Regulatory and Judicial Precedent Under the National Bank Act, Glass-Steagall 
Act, and Bank Holding Company Act, 36 SW. L.J. 765, 768 (1982). 
 36.  Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, repealed by Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 37. Markham, supra note 21, at 237–38; see also Karen E. Klein, What Regulation Q’s Repeal 
Means for Business Checking, BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2011), http:// www.businessweek.com/small-
business/what-regulation-qs-repeal-means-for-business-checking-07222011.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/BCH-3AYT (stating that Regulation Q “regulated interest rates on various bank 
accounts, but it was whittled away by 1980s deregulation legislation”). 
 38.  See RICHARD GROSSMAN, UNSETTLED ACCOUNT: THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING IN THE 
INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD SINCE 1800 (2010).  
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Ricki Tigert Helfer, What Deposit Insurance Can and Cannot Do, 36 FIN. & DEV. 22, 22 
(1999). 
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and comprehensive federal regulation of banking started in earnest.41 
If the federal government was going to foot the bill for bank failures, it 
was also going to make sure banks were behaving responsibly. 
Glass-Steagall’s activity restrictions succeeded in keeping 
banking crisis-free for nearly fifty years,42 but this regulatory regime 
also fell victim to significant change in the industry. These bright-line 
restrictions could not be maintained without sacrificing the 
profitability and competitiveness of the banking industry. By the 
1990s, banking had become far more complex and international in 
nature.43 Further, many traditional banking functions had migrated 
out of banks and into the capital markets with the development of 
money market accounts.44 Responding to these changes, regulators 
abandoned the clear-cut lines of activity restrictions. This move has 
recently been criticized, and many are calling for reinstituted “walls” 
between “safe” banking functions, such as deposit taking and lending, 
and “risky” banking functions, which now include derivatives trading 
and the sale of an ever-expanding array of securitized products.45 
Proponents of activity restrictions argue that, from the 1930s 
until the 1970s, this regime kept banks stable and safe with few bank 
failures; it was not until regulators disregarded activity restrictions 
that banks began to fail, turning the threat of repeated crises in 
banking into a reality.46 As it turns out, this account is accurate but 
 41. Although the NBA was the first comprehensive federal banking legislation, its purpose 
was not to regulate banks or support them through deposit insurance. 
 42.  Mehmet Hasan Eken et al., The Evolutions in Regulations in Banking: A Cycle Based 
Approach, 2 ACRN J. FIN. & RISK PERSPECTIVES 15, 18 (2013). 
 43.  See id. at 19 (“[T]he dismantlement of GSA was inevitable due to the fact that the 
deregulation of banking industries in developed countries (mainly in Europe) had potentially 
placed U.S. banks in a disadvantageous environment and left them uncompetitive.”); The Long 
Demise of Glass-Steagall, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/ 
weill/demise.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WTC6-B8Z8 (“One reason Greenspan favor[ed] 
greater deregulation [was] to help U.S. banks compete with foreign institutions.”). 
 44.  The Long Demise of Glass-Steagall, supra note 43. 
 45.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-To-
Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 747-79 (2010); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow 
Banking: An Overdue Reform That Could Solve the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem and Align US and 
UK Financial Regulation of Financial Conglomerates (Part 1), 31 No. 3 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 
POL’Y REP. 1, 15–19 (2012) (stating that Dodd-Frank did not implement a regulatory regime that 
would correct the risk exposure of banks from risky nonbanking activities). 
 46. See Terry Carter, How Lawyers Enabled the Meltdown and How They Might Have 
Prevented It, 95 A.B.A. J. 34, 35 (2009) (stating that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act created a new 
regulatory regime that allowed banks to partake in the same activities as brokerage firms and 
investment bankers, which lead to increased risk taking by banks and contributed to the financial 
meltdown); Richard Grossman, U.S. Banking History, Civil War to World War II, EH.NET (March 
16, 2008), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/us-banking-history-civil-war-to-world-war-ii/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8B9J-BKEX (“For example, several court decisions, along with the Financial 
Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) of 1999, have blurred the previously strict 
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too simplistic. Well before activity restrictions were officially lifted by 
regulators, banks were finding ways around them.47 Banks claimed 
that changes in banking were incompatible with outdated 
restrictions.48 In other words, the lifting of activity restrictions was not 
a forward-looking move but rather a regulatory response to a new 
reality in banking. By the 1970s, U.S. banks could claim, with good 
reason, that they could not compete with foreign banks or the private 
securities firms without being permitted to offer increased services, 
diversify their investment products, and access higher-profit markets 
to offset interest rate losses. 
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in activity 
restrictions.49 The Volcker Rule calls for restrictions that would 
separate higher-risk activities from traditional banking activities.50 
The wisdom of the Volcker Rule and other modernized forms of activity 
restrictions is beyond the scope of this Article. Rising pressures for its 
adoption, however, illustrate how banking law continues to evolve in 
response to crisis—in this case, the financial crisis of 2008. 
C. The Shift: From Bright-Line to Market-Driven Regulation 
For many years, banks were primarily engaged in lending and 
deposit taking, and they had a monopoly in the consumer and 
corporate credit markets. Activity and geographic restrictions were 
well suited to this era of simple banking. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
banking changed fundamentally due to competition from the capital 
markets, increased technology, and the globalization of finance. As 
banking became more complex, banking regulation changed. The clear 
separations between banking and commerce eroded, and bright-line 
regulatory rules were discarded in favor of more nuanced, 
discretionary, market-driven models. Both regulators and banks 
separation between different financial service industries (particularly, although not limited to 
commercial and investment banking).”); see also CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 28, at 
27 (arguing that “the once formidable wall between commercial and investment banking fell after 
a long bombardment”). 
 47.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to 
the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 987 (2011); see The Long Demise of Glass-
Steagall, supra note 43 (explaining the various ways in which the Federal Reserve Board 
interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act to allow previously prohibited activities).  
 48.  Corinne Crawford, The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Current Financial 
Crisis, 9 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 127, 128 (2011). 
 49.  David Cho & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama’s ‘Volcker Rule’ Shifts Power Away from 
Geithner, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/01/21/AR2010012104935.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BV45-B9AD. 
 50.  Id. Advocates for renewed activity restrictions have also suggested breaking up the 
banks. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 47, at 987.  
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favored these shifts because the deployment of new regulatory tools—
such as disclosure rules, capital requirements, and risk management 
modeling—involved fewer regulatory intrusions and greater freedom 
for banks to compete in the financial industry. Regulators, who were 
unable to keep up with the complexity of the market also preferred 
market-centered regimes that allowed banking counterparties and the 
banks themselves to evaluate risk. 
D. Disclosure 
The premise of the disclosure regulatory regime is that 
regulators must enforce the frequent dissemination of material facts 
about publically traded companies so that the market can accurately 
gauge the price of its securities. Disclosure facilitates market 
discipline, which in turn protects investors. However, unlike securities 
regulators, banking regulators historically have not embraced 
disclosure as a primary regulatory tool. Because of banks’ 
susceptibility to runs and their extreme need for consumer trust, bank 
regulators gave them “special treatment” and did not force them to 
disclose their vulnerabilities so as to prevent “an irrational public 
response leading to runs on banks.”51 Confidentiality, rather than 
disclosure, was used as a way to shield banks from instability. Thus, 
the regulatory regime sought to maintain public confidence in banks 
by keeping information about their condition confidential.52 The 
emphasis on confidentiality in banking regulation after the Depression 
was perhaps “most tellingly revealed by the exclusion of banks from 
the . . . mandatory disclosure regime implemented by the Securities 
Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”53 Ironically, 
these reforms were initially enacted to respond to the misdeeds of the 
banking industry.54 
 51. Laurie Durcan & Bruce K. Riordan, Banking Disclosures, Financial Privacy, and the 
Public Interest, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 391, 395 (1987).  
 52. Id. at 400.  
 53. Robert P. Bartlett, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293, 307 (2012). Most 
of today’s large TBTF banks were formerly investment banks that used to be held as 
partnerships. Starting in the 1970s and ending in the mid-1990s, these commercial banks and 
investment banks went public in waves. Once they did, the disclosure regimes attached to most 
large banks that were not already public entities. 
 54.  See generally MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW FERDINAND 
PECORA’S INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE (2010). 
Investigations immediately following the Great Depression focused on short sellers and other 
market operators. Id. at 129. When Ferdinand Pecora took over these investigations into the 
Great Crash, he changed the focus of the investigation. Id. Pecora “for the first time . . . showed 
commercial bankers engaged in a reckless grab for profits that pushed hard on the boundaries of 
legal behavior.” Id. For instance, compensation practices for officers “provided an incentive for 
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Historically, banks were forced to disclose information to their 
regulators, but this information, referred to as “call reports,” was kept 
confidential.55 In 1972, the FDIC made these call reports publicly 
available due to increasing bank failures and the growing notion that 
market devices could discipline banks along with activity 
restrictions.56 As the banking market became increasingly deregulated 
and traditional “command and control” banking regulation became 
unpopular, market discipline was increasingly seen as a key pillar of 
bank oversight. Increased disclosure, it was thought, would lead to 
market discipline, which would make command-and-control regulation 
less necessary.57 During this time, the FDIC, OCC, and FRB moved 
toward requiring increased disclosure in banks’ annual financial 
statements.58 Congress gave these regulators increased enforcement 
excessive risk taking,” causing officers to “focus on short-term profits, not long term 
performance.” Id at 146–47. These compensation practices incentivized officers to sell risky 
securities without adequately informing the public about these securities; rather, officers advised 
the public to rely on the incomplete information provided by the banks. Id at 152. Pecora showed 
that this problem permeated the banking industry, from the smaller banks all the way to “the 
top of the banking structure.” Id at 219. It was Pecora’s belief that “the absence of any regulations 
requiring disclosures to shareholders and investors” was one of the main culprits of that period’s 
financial woes. Id at 272. After the investigation, and “[w]ith Pecora still keeping pressure on 
Wall Street,” Congress passed a securities bill with the idea that “[n]ew securities could now only 
be sold if investors were given all the information they needed to make an informed decision 
about whether to buy them.” Id at 287–88.  
 55. Alfred D. Mathewson, From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline: The Role of 
Disclosure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. CORP. L. 139, 143 (1986). The 
examination “[reviewed] all of the operations of the bank, including loan practices, trust 
operations, internal control, checking and savings accounts, data processing, internal security, 
and personnel practices.” Id. 
 56. Bartlett, supra note 53, at 309.  
 57. Id. at 304–05. (“In light of these events, it was generally believed that market 
participants could potentially provide an important ally in bank oversight.”). Publicly available 
call reports were revised at this time “to increase the information available about a bank’s loan 
portfolio.” Id. at 309. Additionally, in 1983, “[m]assive payment defaults on international loans 
encouraged Congress to pass the Lending Supervision Act” which “requires all banks and bank 
holding companies to publically disclose any material concentrations of loan exposure in foreign 
countries” quarterly to the regulators. Durcan & Riordan, supra note 51, at 398. In the late 1980s, 
“the FDIC initiated a program for the commercial publication, on a quarterly basis, of redacted 
decisions of the FDIC Board of Directors (removing identities of banks and other parties) and the 
accompanying decisions of the administrative law judges issued in formal enforcement 
adjudications.” Michael P. Malloy, Public Disclosure as a Tool of Federal Bank Regulation, 9 ANN. 
REV. BANKING L. 229, 236 (1990).  
 58. Id. at 236–40. Banks’ financial statements were to be available to “security holders, 
depositors, and anyone who [requested]” them. 12 C.F.R. § 18.1(a) (1989). For banks regulated by 
the FDIC, the report was to include: 
(i) a fair presentation of the bank's financial condition at the end of that year and the 
preceding year; (ii) the results of operations for each such year; (iii) other information 
that the FDIC may require of a particular bank; and (iv) a specified disclaimer to the 
effect that “[t]his statement has not been reviewed, or confirmed for accuracy or 
relevance, by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.”  
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power to administer the sections of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts 
(“SEC Acts”) that applied to banks.59 Further, in 1964, Congress 
subjected companies with greater than five hundred shareholders and 
$1 million of assets to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the 
Exchange Act. Congress delegated enforcement powers to the FDIC, 
OCC, and FRB. These legislative changes ended the “three-decade 
exemption of many banks from federal periodic disclosure obligations.” 
In addition to government intervention, industry evolution 
contributed to greater information sharing by banks. Most 
significantly, the 1970s and 1980s saw a surge of banks going public, 
thereby triggering quarterly public disclosure obligations under the 
SEC Acts.60 
However, despite the move toward more disclosure, bank 
regulators continued to give banks special protection from the usual 
rules of corporate openness. For example, the results of regularly 
conducted bank examinations of banks, which result in a rating system 
referred to as CAMELS, are confidential and immune from even 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests.61 
Malloy, supra note 57, at 243 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 350.4). The OCC and FRB reports were 
substantially identical. Id. 
 59.  “Congressional concern in 1964 with the volume of OTC trading in the shares of banks 
and other nonlisted companies ultimately prompted Congress to subject any company with 
greater than 500 shareholders of record and $1 million of assets to the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of the Exchange Act,” ending the “three-decade exemption of many banks from 
federal periodic disclosure obligations.” Bartlett, supra note 53, at 308. The amendment also 
delegated enforcement powers to the agencies (FDIC, OCC, FRB) that already regulated banks. 
Thus, “[s]ince 1964, the banking regulators also enforced the periodic reporting and proxy 
requirements of the Exchange Act pertaining to publicly traded banks under their supervision.” 
David G. Oedel, Civil Liability for the Concealment of Bank Trouble, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 443, 
446 (1987). 
 60.  Steven M. Davidoff, Did Going Public Spoil the Banks?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2008), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E7DF1639F931A1575BC0A96E9C8B63, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BB3N-BTQQ. The Securities Act of 1933 was centered around the 
idea of disclosure with the purpose of better informing investors on their sales and purchases of 
securities. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 focused on the registration and regulation of 
securities exchanges, or, in other words, the secondary trading of securities between persons 
unrelated to the insurer. The 1934 Act also targeted brokers and dealers and implemented broad 
antifraud and antimanipulation standards. Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the 1934 Act incorporates 
standards for continuous registration, annual and periodic reports, and stockholder proxy 
solicitation disclosures for companies whose securities are already in public hands. 
 61.  FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 1.1, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/, archived at http://perma.cc/R3TE-J768 (last 
updated Nov. 13, 2012); see also John Crawford, Predicting Failure, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 171, 
197–98 (2012) (explaining the CAMELS system and noting that it “is highly confidential and is 
known only to the relevant examiners and bank managers”). 
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E. Capital 
The capital regime requires banks to have a capital floor, which 
is the regulatory version of equity or net worth—it is the amount by 
which a firm’s assets exceed the firm’s liabilities.62 If a bank meets 
minimum capital requirements, there will be little need for 
governmental micromanagement of bank activities. The minimum 
capital requirement is designed to protect safety and soundness by 
forcing firms to have more skin in the game and ownership of their 
risks. The theory of forcing firms to maintain a floor on capital is that 
the higher the floor, the less likely a firm is to engage in risky 
activities. Therefore, the battle between regulators and banks has been 
over how much capital is required, with banks generally advocating 
less and regulators encouraging more.63 
The more equity a bank has, all other things being equal, the 
less likely it is to fall into insolvency. Capital is often referred to as a 
buffer,64 but to think of it as a buffer is misleading. When a bank 
experiences a loss, the bank’s capital is not affected. Only when a bank 
experiences a net balance sheet loss (when they have more liabilities 
than assets) does capital become relevant. In that event, the net loss 
represents a loss of assets against liabilities; when assets fall below 
liabilities, the bank is insolvent and equity (capital) losses occur. In 
other words, capital is shareholder equity; it does not refer to bank 
reserves. 
Capital is purely a balance sheet item and represents the gap 
between the firm’s equity or ownership interest (i.e., common stock) 
and its liabilities. It is not cash in a safe, but it is a reflection of how a 
bank funds itself. A bank can either fund itself through debt (i.e., 
loans) or equity (i.e., stock). The more a bank funds itself through the 
latter, the higher the capital ratio.65 Banks prefer higher leverage (to 
 62. CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 28, at 252–53. 
 63.  Dawn Kopecki & Zachary Tracer, Dimon Says Banks to Have More Capital Than They 
Can Use, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 26, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-
26/dimon-says-banks-to-have-more-capital-than-they-know-how-to-use.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/PV8M-YUZN (quoting JPMorgan, Chase & Co. CEO Jamie Dimon as believing that all 
banks would soon have too much capital and that regulation encouraging banks to hold on to 
capital could impede growth).  
 64.  James Shotter, Switzerland Imposes Capital Buffer on Banks, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 13, 
2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/be839108-75ca-11e2-b702-00144feabdc0.html. 
 65.  Banks prefer to fund themselves through debt because they view it as cheaper than 
equity. However, Admati and Hellwig dispute this. They argue that it is only cheaper today 
because banks are already highly leveraged and must pay more for equity because of their 
heightened risk exposure. Admanti and Hellwig contend that this way of doing business is not 
the only option. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 112 (2013).  
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have less of an equity interest) because they can achieve greater 
returns on their investments. However, this leverage also creates 
heightened risk. For example, shareholders who stand to lose more 
equity (capital) will likely engage in less risk taking than one that is 
less exposed.66 One of the purposes of the capital regime, therefore, is 
to affect manager behavior in favor of more prudent decisionmaking. 
Over the past thirty years, regulators and banks have been engaged in 
an ongoing negotiation over how much capital is ideal. 
The capital regime is quite complex, with capital ratios that are 
calculated based on several tiers of capital that depend on levels of 
risk.67 Common stock, for example, is Tier 1, and subordinated debt is 
Tier 2.68 Each bank must retain certain percentages of each tier of 
capital, with more risk-tolerant banks preferring the higher-risk Tier 
2 category and risk-averse banks and regulators preferring the safer 
Tier 1 categories.69 Aside from the voluminous discussions on how 
capital should be categorized, it is the consensus of most regulators 
and industry observers that the ultimate strength of a bank rests on 
its net worth or capital funds.70 
The capital regime started in earnest just as the activity 
restrictions regime started to fall out of favor. The capital regime 
allows banks to conduct their business any way they choose as long as 
they have a minimum amount of regulatory capital. This new regime 
seemed appropriate for the new world of complex banking, where 
banks were constantly one step ahead of the regulators that were 
trying to prohibit new risk taking. It is perhaps the easiest form of 
bank regulation for the modern era—although its simplicity has 
diminished as capital requirements have been spliced into tiers, 
percentages, and tranches.71 
  Complexities have also grown because capital requirements 
have become entangled with risk modeling, as discussed below. Capital 
requirements have been a part of U.S. regulatory history since the 
 66.  See David Enrich &Victoria McGrane, Capital Rules Tighten for Big Banks, WALL ST. 
J. (June 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702303627104576409662082986084. 
 67.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 14 (2006). 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id.  
 70. Sandra L. Ryon, History of Bank Capital Adequacy Analysis (FDIC Div. of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 69-41, 1969). 
 71. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The Dog and the Frisbee 9, 
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 366th Economic Policy Symposium, “The 
Changing Policy Landscape”, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf?frames=0, archived at http://perma.cc/FM2-USFX. 
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earliest days of banking but were applied inconsistently and 
haphazardly until they were standardized in the 1980s in response to 
large-scale bank failures.72 During this time, both U.S. and 
international banks were distressed. The Basel Committee, an 
international forum of bank regulators that issue standardized 
supervisory guidelines, was formed to streamline and modernize 
international banking regulation.73 In 1988, the Basel Committee 
issued a final report (“Basel I”) that included minimum capital 
requirements.74 The Committee’s innovative approach to capital 
accounted for differences in the riskiness of assets. Basel I created four 
risk categories and announced guidelines weighing each balance sheet 
item’s riskiness and assigning it to a category.75 The capital required 
for each bank was determined by weighing and sorting assets by risk.76 
 72.  1895 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 39 (reporting that in 1895 state 
minimum capital requirements “varie[d] from no provisions at all, and elsewhere from $5,000 to 
$100,000”). The first federal capital requirements were part of the NBA in 1864, which required 
banks to retain various capital thresholds depending on the population of the surrounding areas. 
National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 7, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). In 1933, the federal government introduced capital requirements that were a 
percentage of a firm’s deposits. Roland I. Robinson, The Capital Deposit Ratio in Banking 
Supervision, 49 J. POL. ECON. 41, 41, 43, 47–49 (1941). At that time, minimum capital levels were 
determined by calculating a leverage ratio that compared a bank’s capital to total assets. The 
ratio was set by the OCC and the FRB at six percent for some community banks and five percent 
for larger regional banks; the FDIC established a six percent ratio for all banks, regardless of 
size. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, Interpretive Letter 3-1506 (Dec. 
17, 1981); FDIC, Statement of Policy on Capital Adequacy, 46 Fed. Reg. 62,693-02 (1981); see also 
Phil Battey, Regulators Fail on Uniform Bank Capital Policy, AM BANKER, Dec. 18, 1981, at 1 
(summarizing the different approaches adopted by the FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve). 
However, even these capital requirements were difficult to enforce without a legislative mandate 
supporting regulatory enforcement. Banking statutes at the time did not mention specific capital 
requirements. In one case, in spite of the fact that a bank “ranked near the bottom of its peer 
group in all of the equity related ratios,” the Fifth Circuit held that the OCC had not presented 
sufficient evidence to show that operating with less capital was unsafe or unsound. First Nat’l 
Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 677, 679, 685 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983). 
The regulatory enforcement mandate came when Congress passed the International Lending 
Supervision Act of 1983, which required banking regulators to “cause banking institutions to 
achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such 
banking institutions.” International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 
908(a)(1), 97 Stat. 1278, 1280, § 908(a)(2), 97 Stat. 1280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2)). The 
Act gave regulators the authority to establish minimum levels of capital and deemed it an unsafe 
and unsound practice for banks to have capital below the threshold. Id. at § 908(a)(2), 97 Stat. 
1280, §908(b)(1), 97 Stat. 1280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2), (b)(1)). 
 73. See Benton E. Gup, Introduction to the Basel Capital Accords, in THE NEW BASEL 
CAPITAL ACCORD 1, 1 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004).  
 74. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs04a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CG3H-WXUZ. 
 75.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 67, at 231.  
 76.  Id.  
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The Basel I approach was adopted by U.S. regulators in 1989 and 
became effective in 1990.77 
The Basel I framework favored a “risk-weighted” ratio, as 
opposed to the previous U.S. regime of a simple “leverage ratio.”78 The 
innovative risk weighing was said to more accurately account for 
different types of risks, but even this new complex and sensitive 
framework soon became too simplistic for an increasingly complex 
banking system. In short, these risk categories were both under- and 
overinclusive, promoting regulatory arbitrage. Several shortcomings 
became apparent: (1) the four risk categories were overly broad 
approximations of risk, which caused some banks to easily evade the 
rules by investing in risky assets or off–balance sheet items that were 
far riskier than their category acknowledged;79 (2) the Basel I 
categories accounted only for credit risk and not other types of risk, 
such as operational risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, and so 
forth;80 and (3) the Basel I framework did not adequately gauge risks 
for large banks that were pioneering new products, such as derivatives 
that could not easily be categorized without complex internal risk 
models.81 In other words, risk weighing suffered from the same 
 77. OCC Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4169 (Jan. 27, 1989) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A); Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State Member Banks: Risk-Based Measure, 
12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A (2014); Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies: Risk-
Based Measure, 12 C.F. R. pt. 225, app. A; Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 325, app. A. Congress implemented similar requirements for thrift institutions as part of the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 
103 Stat. 183, 303–04 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463–1464 (1990)). The thrift regulator has 
previously proposed similar guidelines. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Proposed Rule, 
Regulatory Capital Requirements for Insured Institutions, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,800 (Dec. 23, 1988). 
 78.  See BASEL COMM., supra note 67, at 12 (“In developing the revised Framework, the 
Committee has sought to arrive at significantly more risk-sensitive capital requirements . . . .”); 
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISED BASEL III LEVERAGE RATIO FRAMEWORK AND 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 1 (2014) (“[A] simple leverage ratio framework is critical and 
complementary to the risk-based capital framework.”). 
 79. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 80–82 (2008) (cataloguing various types of regulatory arbitrage possible 
under Basel I, but concluding that “there is very little empirical work that quantifies the 
practice”); Steven R. Grenadier & Brian Hall, Risk-Based Capital Standards and the Riskiness 
of Bank Portfolios: Credit and Factor Risks, 26 REG. SCI. & URBAN ECON. 433, 438 (1996); Patricia 
A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of Global Convergence in Banking Law, 7 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 433, 450–56 (2001); Camille M. Caesar, Note, Capital-Based Regulation and U.S. 
Banking Reform, 101 YALE L.J 1525, 1542 n.106 (1992). 
 80. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RISK-BASED CAPITAL: BANK REGULATORS 
NEED TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS TO FINALIZING THE PROPOSED 
BASEL II FRAMEWORK 9–10, 16 (2007) (identifying various risks and explaining that Basel I did 
not account for them); Michael P. Malloy, Capital Adequacy and Regulatory Objectives, 25 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 299, 313–14 (2002). 
 81. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 80, at 17.  
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problems that plague risk management in general: the inability to 
account for new bank activities that generate unprecedented risks. 
Basel II was issued in 2004 to address these problems.82 It 
accounted for a variety of risks in addition to credit risk and permitted 
firms to use their internal risk modeling mechanisms to evaluate more 
complex product lines.83 Basel II also called for heightened supervision 
and disclosure in an effort to facilitate market discipline of capital 
retention by banks.84 A key criticism of Basel II focuses on its reliance 
on internal risk modeling by banks, which is often unreliable and hard 
to evaluate.85 Others note that the outsourcing of risk modeling to self-
interested financial institutions is inappropriate and can lead to 
abuse.86 Basel II was adopted by U.S. regulators for only the largest 
banks and only in a way that required them to implement its 
requirements on a phased-in basis.87 
 82. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf?noframes=1, archived at http://perma.cc/RZ4-5TJL 
[hereinafter BASEL II]; see BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OVERVIEW OF THE NEW 
BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 2 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca02.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K8UR-W9TX (stating that the Basel Committee’s primary goal was “to deliver a 
more risk-sensitive standardized approach that on average neither raises nor lowers regulator 
capital for internationally active banks”). 
 83. BASEL II, supra note 82, at 48–112, 142–48. 
 84. Id. at 158–90. 
 85. See, e.g., TARULLO, supra note 79, at 79, 152–59; George G. Kaufman, Basel II: The Roar 
that Moused, in THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 39, 43 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004): 
[T]he loss rates determined by regulators are subject to large errors so that gaming is 
still likely, and the models used by the banks to generate their internal values are 
likely to be too complex and opaque for supervisors (and even many bankers 
themselves) to understand thoroughly, so the resulting capital amounts will be 
difficult to evaluate for adequacy and compliance with the requirements. 
Douglas O. Edwards, Comment, An Unfortunate “Tail”: Reconsidering Risk Management 
Incentives After the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 268 (2010) 
(concluding that the value-at-risk model “is powerful, but . . . but fails to capture an outlier event 
that might topple a financial institution”). 
 86. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial 
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 180–86 (2009) 
[hereinafter Code, Crash]; Erik F. Gerding, The Dangers of Delegating Financial Regulation to 
Risk Models, 29 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1, 5–6 (2010) [hereinafter Dangers of 
Delegating]; Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation: 
Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT’L LAW 43, 57 (2003). 
 87. John C. Dugan & Jennifer Xi, Briefing Paper to European Parliament Policy 
Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, U.S. Implementation of Basel II: Final Rules 
Issued, but No Supervisory Approvals to Date (2011), available at, http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201110/20111012ATT29102/20111012ATT29
102EN.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E2T8-8EVD. 
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The financial crisis of 2008 brought with it a renewed emphasis 
on capital requirements.88 Some claimed that insufficient enforcement 
of capital requirements caused the crisis.89 Even so, the Treasury took 
the position—and Congress ultimately agreed—that the capital 
requirement percentages should be left up to regulators so as to 
prevent too rigid of a framework.90 Three years after the passage of 
Dodd-Frank, regulators are still debating the best formula to use as 
they implement new capital rules.91 
Meanwhile, the shortcomings of Basel II have produced the 
recently promulgated Basel III accord.92 Erik Gerding explains that 
the gamesmanship of Basel I and Basel II begat Basel III.93 However, 
Basel III still relies on risk weighing to categorize different capital 
categories. Basel III has honed (or some say further complicated)94 the 
risk-weighted formula that applies to the largest banks. The new ratio, 
a very low three percent, includes securitized risks, on–balance sheet 
 88. See, e.g., William M. Isaac, How to Save the Financial System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 
2008, at A23 (arguing that the U.S. implementation of Basel II will exacerbate the financial crisis 
by requiring additional capital when none is available); Lawrence B. Lindsey, The Panic of 2008: 
Loosen Deposit Insurance Rules to Prevent Bank Run, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A27 (arguing 
that risk-based capital standards are not appropriate). 
 89. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION: 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS SYSTEM 6 (2009); Damian Paletta, Regulators Agree to Create Stricter 
Capital Requirements for Banks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2009, 2:55 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123868295604882511.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q37U-
REPV (quoting U.S. Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan as stating that “there was not 
enough capital in the banking system coming into” the financial crisis). But see TARULLO, supra 
note 79, at 259 (concluding that it is unlikely that “any capital regulation regime could have 
sufficiently contained [mortgage-backed securities] risks so that the subprime situation would 
have been merely a problem rather than a crisis”).  
 90. Mike Konczal, Dodd-Frank is Finally Being Implemented. Will that be Enough?, WASH. 
POST (May 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/06/dodd-frank-
is-finally-being-implemented-will-that-be-enough/, archived at http://perma.cc/8CFA-LBEQ. 
 91.  See Jennifer McGillivary & Hung-Gay Fung, The Need for Ethical Reform in the US 
Financial Industry, 5 INT’L REV. ACCT., BANKING & FIN. 17, 36 (2013) (“If there were a clear 
answer to all of the questions [surrouding regulation and ethics in the financial industry], much 
of the concern about the financial industry and its professionals would not exist.”); Charles M. 
Horn et al., Dodd-Frank Implementation: Navigating the Road Ahead, MONDAQ (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/214152/Financial+Services/DoddFrank+Implementation
+Navigating+The+Road+Ahead, archived at http://perma.cc/AL7Z-A39M (“We anticipate that, in 
the first half of 2013, the federal bank regulatory agencies will finalize the three capital proposals 
that were released in June 2012.”). 
 92.  Emily Lee, Basel III and Its New Capital Requirements, as Distinguished From Basel 
II, 131 BANKING L.J. 27, 27–28 (2014). 
 93.  ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 197–235 (2014). 
 94.  Haldane, supra note 71, at 6–7 (noting that Basel III is six-hundred pages long 
compared to just thirty pages of Basel I without any added benefit). 
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assets, derivative exposures,95 and other modern financial products. 
Critics claim that, even with Basel III’s targeted approach, the ratio is 
too low and the formula still allows for circumvention and risk 
hiding.96 Basel III has not yet been adopted by the United States.97 
Regulators remain uncertain about which parts of Basel III’s new 
formula to adopt and how much they want to rely on blunter leverage 
ratios.98 Many observers, including Senators Sherrod Brown and 
David Vitter, have proposed abandoning the Basel framework and 
simply refocusing on heightened leverage ratios.99 
In The Bankers’ New Clothes, Professors Anat Admati and 
Martin Hellwig argue that the legislative and regulatory reactions to 
the financial crisis leave the essential structure of the economy’s 
circulatory system as fragile as it ever was.100 Their book reads as an 
ode to simple and strict capital requirements. Admati and Hellwig 
identify a threshold cause of and a threshold response to the crisis 
banking: the cause, too much debt; the solution, significantly more 
equity.101 After that buffer is established, the urgency of getting 
exactly right every detail of every stress test, living will, or individual 
regulation will matter less. Admati and Hellwig argue, in other words, 
 95. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, BASEL III LEVERAGE RATIO: U.S. PROPOSES AMERICAN 
ADD-ON; BASEL COMMITTEE PROPOSES IMPORTANT DENOMINATOR CHANGES 7 (2013), 
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/07.19.13.Basel_.3.Leverage.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/UQ8J-SKS8. 
 96.  See Brooke Masters, Basel III Capital Rules Too Low, Says Turner, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 
16, 2011, 7:10 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/92b24f80-4fff-11e0-9ad1-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2cYQSNI90, archived at http://perma.cc/LNA5-52GQ; Thomas Hoenig, 
Basel III Capital Interim Final Rule and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FDIC (July 9, 2013), 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/hoenig/statement7-9-2013.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/6YF-7CVV (noting that the Basel III standard “remains inadequate to the task of 
assuring the American public . . . that our capital standards are adequate to contribute to 
financial stability.”). 
 97.  Basel III was adopted by the Federal Reserve board on July 2, 2013. Tom Braithwaite, 
Banks Await Orders as Fed Acts on Basel III, FIN. TIMES (July 2, 2013, 7:18 PM), http:// 
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/94abb696-e337-11e2-9bb2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2cYQSNI90, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q4W4-X4AT. 
 98.  Simon Watkins, Basel Loosens Banks’ Leverage Ratio Proposals but New FX Trading 
World Is Still Uncertain, EUROMONEY.COM (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/ 
3297585/Basel-loosens-banks-leverage-ratio-proposals-but-new-FX-trading-world-is-still-
uncertain.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QR2Z-63E7. 
 99.  James Pethokoukis, Senators Brown and Vitter Offer a Smart and Simple Plan to End 
Too Big To Fail, AEIDEAS (Apr. 25, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/04/senators-
brown-and-vitter-offers-a-smart-and-simple-plan-to-end-too-big-to-fail/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/Q7WS-J6HT ; see also Felix Salmon, Basel: The SIFI Surcharge Arrives, REUTERS (June 
27, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/06/27/basel-the-sifi-surcharge-arrives/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HXG8-4NGL (discussing Basel III’s potentially negative incentive 
structure). 
 100.  ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 65, at 192.  
 101.  Id. 
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that we can and should have debates about risk management and 
activity restrictions, but only after the basic parameters of 
significantly increased equity are put in place.102 This new model is 
best defined as regulation by capital—or their preferred term, equity. 
The premise is that private actors are incentivized to displace the costs 
of their risky activities to the fullest extent possible and that banking 
regulation should prevent that displacement to the greatest extent 
possible.103 In other words, regulators should push banks toward 
equity-based, rather than debt-based, financing, notwithstanding 
pressures on managers to minimize existing equity positions. Activity 
restrictions, risk management infrastructure, and the rest are all 
terrific tools for in-house use. But allowing those mechanisms to 
replace the risk-dampening effect of increased equity is foolish and 
dangerous. 
In conclusion, the future of capital requirements is unclear. 
Many advocate that regulators should get entirely out of the business 
of activity restrictions, risk management, and general oversight, that 
the only thing regulators should enforce is capital requirements and 
leave the rest to the banks.104 On the other hand, the banking industry 
continues to oppose heightened capital requirements. It will continue 
to fall on regulators to determine how much capital is required to reach 
the desired outcome of changing managerial incentives to favor 
prudence over risk taking.105 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Victoria Finkle, Regulators Should Boost the Leverage Ratio for Big Banks, Senators 
Say, AM. BANKER (Nov. 22, 2013, 12:58 PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/ 
issues/178_226/regulators-should-boost-the-leverage-ratio-for-big-banks-senators-say-1063858-
1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9HMF-G7LF; Ray Grace, Don’t Blame Camels for Human 
Failure, AM. BANKER (June 4, 2013, 4:30 PM), available at http:// 
www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/dont-blame-camels-for-human-failures-1059610-1.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/V8EQ-GUJV; Mark W. Olson, Banking Industry Overly Focused on 
Capital, AM. BANKER (July 18, 2013, 1:45 PM), available at http:// 
www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/banking-industry-overly-focused-on-capital-1060700-
1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/F5D2-MQFQ; Richard J. Parsons, It’s Time to Kill CAMELS, 
AM. BANKER (June 1, 2013), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/ magazine/123_6/its-
time-to-kill-camels-according-to-bofa-risk-exec-1059172-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
5GT4-UR5F.  
 105.  Julie A. Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. 
L.J. 645, 696–97 (2012) (noting that regulators had broad discretion but were not at all diligent 
in enforcing them in the past ten years).  
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 F. Risk Management 
The risk management regime involved the most hands-off 
regulatory oversight mechanism prior to Dodd-Frank. To respond to 
increased complexity in financial markets as well as increased 
diversity of financial products, banks saw risk modeling as the most 
effective way to protect themselves from losses. Resulting risk models 
took many different forms but generally involved complex computer 
models that accounted for potential dangers to the firm, product line, 
or specific trade.106 As banks relied more and more on these risk 
models to hedge their positions, regulators took note. But the 
regulators did not do so through comprehensive or thorough oversight 
of risk models. Instead, they stayed on the sidelines as banks 
developed and relied on these new management tools. 107 
The risk management regime was born in the mid-1980s as 
firms grappled with unanticipated market shocks. After the stock 
market crash of 1987, many firms adopted technology-based risk 
management practices.108 During this time, Value at Risk (“VaR”) 
measurements were initiated when JP Morgan’s CEO Dennis 
Weatherstone wanted an answer to the question, “How much could 
JPM lose if tomorrow turns out to be a relatively bad day?”109 The 
purpose of the VaR regime is to determine how much exposure a firm 
has to downside risk based on highly sophisticated modeling.110 VaR 
modeling was labeled “the New Benchmark for Managing Financial 
Risk,” and there have been “over 200 books published on VaR since the 
October 1987 crash, roughly one a month.”111 
If VaR signaled a fundamental shift in risk modeling, firm-led 
stress testing (i.e., firms using computer models to determine the type 
and extent of loss they could withstand) was the second wave of reform 
in risk management, with “over 250 articles on stress testing in the 
past ten years, or more than one a fortnight.”112 The risk management 
 106.  See Dangers of Delegating, supra note 86, at 1 (discussing the combination of 
technological advances and financial innovation that allowed for the development of these 
sophisticated computer models beginning in the 1980s). 
 107.  See Code, Crash, supra note 86, at 133.  
 108.  Richard Griffiths & Shahid Chaudhri, How to Avoid Another Failure of Risk 
Management (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://www.investment-strategy-wire.com/ 
archive_1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8H4-6ZF9. 
 109. Haldane, supra note 5, at 3. 
 110. Peter Conti-Brown, A Proposed Fat-Tail Metric: Disclosure, Derivatives, and the 
Measurement of Financial Risk, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2010).  
 111. Haldane, supra note 5, at 4.  
 112. See id. (“Stress testing has gained greater prominence and credibility within banks as a 
complementary risk management and capital planning tool to provide a different risk 
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regime coincided with a golden decade in banking. “Between October 
1998 and June 2007, banks’ share prices increased almost 60%[,] and 
their balance sheets rose more than threefold.”113 Andrew Haldane 
compared the risk management system to Hans Christian Andersen’s 
fairy tale “The Emperor’s New Clothes.”114 Haldane analogized the risk 
models to the Emperor’s nonexistent clothing: banks flaunted their 
triumph over risk when they were, in fact, walking around naked for a 
decade.115 “The subprime market has played the role of the child in the 
fairytale,” Haldane wrote, “naively but honestly shifting everyone’s 
perceptions about how threadbare the financial system has become.”116 
This following Section first discusses the creation of risk management 
and provides an overview of the types of regulation under the regime. 
Then, it reviews the various problems of risk management, including 
the difficulty of modeling future events based on past occurrences, the 
failure to account for systemic problems, and the misalignment of 
incentives. 
1. Regulators and Risk 
The rise of risk management as a vehicle for risk containment 
paralleled the rise of what has been labeled the “New Governance” 
regime in regulation. The term “New Governance” denotes an 
emerging system of regulatory governance in which the government 
and the private sector work together in dialogue to craft regulation—
as opposed to the traditional system of top-down, government-dictated 
command-and-control regulation.117 Bank regulation during the rise of 
the risk management regime looked very much like a public-private 
partnership. In theory, regulators were to work with large firms to 
oversee firms’ internal risk management processes. In reality, 
regulators deferred to banks to model risk. Rather than critically 
engaging with risk models, regulators’ oversight was mainly aimed at 
assuring that banks had models in place. 
perspective.”); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS 
TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION 6 (May 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs147.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9FUU-7YRZ. 
 113. Haldane, supra note 5, at 4. 
 114.  Id. at 2. 
 115.  Id. at 5.  
 116.  Id. 
 117. Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, (San Diego Legal Studies Paper 
No. 12-101, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179160/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7L6G-NKFZ . For a synopsis of New Governance as applied to finance, 
see Saule Omorova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 666 (2010).  
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A U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report 
released in 2009 states as a principle premise that “financial 
regulators have an important role in assessing risk management 
systems at financial institutions.”118 To assess whether a firm’s 
internal management is accurately controlling risks, bank examiners 
gather data from the firms and then assign a rating meant to assess 
the quality of the institution’s risk management system.119 Before the 
enactment of Dodd-Frank, this oversight was entity-specific with no 
coordinated measure to gauge system-wide risks. Nevertheless, each 
regulator engaged in highly technical modeling of institutional risks, 
most of which incorporated and evaluated the firm’s own risk-modeling 
formulas. Among the various risk-control measures used by regulators, 
the following were the most prominent: 
 
? The FDIC’s CAMELS rating system uses a firm’s financial 
statements as well as on-site examinations to determine the 
firm’s condition with respect to capital adequacy, assets-
management capability, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to 
market risk.120 
? The Federal Reserve has an “R” rating framework (which it has 
not released to the public) whose primary purpose is “assessing 
inherent risk and risk management practices of large financial 
institutions.”121 The Federal Reserve has a program for large, 
complex banking organizations that provides “continuous 
supervision” with a dedicated team assigned to each 
institution.122 The examiner considers “(1) board of directors and 
senior management oversight; (2) policies, procedures, and 
limits; (3) risk monitoring and management information system; 
and (4) internal controls for each of the risk areas.”123 
? The OCC has on-site examiners who assess a firm’s risk 
management practices, and the examiners’ findings are sent to 
the bank’s board of directors. OCC examiners assess the 
 118. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 09-499T, FINANCIAL REGULATION: REVIEW OF 
REGULATORS’ OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE, 
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 22–24 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
130/121973.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6QPM-YK46.  
 119. Id. at 3. 
 120. Id. at 10. Sensitivity to Market Risk is a new measure and foreshadows the move to a 
regulation by hypothetical. This indicator is meant to gauge how vulnerable a particular portfolio 
is to counterparty risk or systemic contagion. 
 121. Id.  
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 11. 
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“quality, quantity, and overall direction of risks” in nine 
categories: strategic, reputation, credit, interest rate, liquidity, 
price, foreign currency translation, transaction, and compliance. 
Specifically, OCC examiners determine the quality of risk 
management by “assess[ing] policies, processes, personnel, and 
control systems in each category.”124  
? The SEC and FINRA (an independent securities regulator) 
“assess the risk management systems of large broker-dealers 
using discrete, but risk-focused examinations.”125 These 
regulators primarily focus on “compliance with their rules and 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.”126 The SEC and 
FINRA conduct “regularly scheduled target examinations that 
focus on the risk areas identified in their risk assessment and on 
compliance with relevant capital rules and customer protection 
rules. At the largest institutions, SEC conducts examinations 
every three years, while FINRA conducts annual examinations 
of all broker-dealers.”127 
 
The GAO report noted that these various systems failed during 
the last financial crisis as many risks were unidentified or ignored by 
regulators.128 Regulators admit that “they had not fully appreciated 
the extent of weaknesses [in risk management] until the financial 
crisis occurred and risk management systems were tested by 
events.”129 Regulators also acknowledged that “they had relied heavily 
on management representations of risks.”130 Among the various 
weaknesses in bank-run stress testing at institutions prior to the 
crisis, the GAO highlighted the institutional practice of relying on 
“intuition” to determine firms’ vulnerability to certain types of risk and 
found that senior managers often “questioned the need for additional 
stress testing, particularly for worst-case scenarios that they thought 
were implausible.”131 
 124.   Id.  
 125.  Id. at 13.  
 126.  Id.  
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 3–4. For example, even though many recommendations by examiners were never 
addressed by institutions, little regulatory follow-up occurred. The regulators interviewed for the 
GAO study admit that “despite these identified weaknesses, they did not take forceful action—
such as changing their assessments—until the crisis occurred because the institutions reported 
a strong financial position and senior management had presented the regulators with plans for 
change.” Id. at 16. 
 129.  Id. at 17.  
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
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Dodd-Frank streamlined risk management with industry-wide 
stress testing, discussed at length below, and the creation of the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).132 FSOC is now the 
primary regulator “charged with identifying risks to the financial 
stability of the United States; promoting market discipline; and 
responding to emerging risks to the stability of the United States’ 
financial system.”133 The OCC is currently in the process of formalizing 
new risk management standards that represent “heightened 
expectations” for the banking industry.134 Acknowledging insufficient 
enforcement of risk management standards before Dodd-Frank, the 
OCC plans to increase both its oversight and enforcement of their new 
standards.135 It is currently working with the banking industry to 
finalize these rules. Industry experts view the new regulatory 
emphasis on standardization of risk management as a sign that “risk 
governance is here to stay and its importance will only increase over 
time.”136 
2. Problems with the Risk Management Regime 
It is important to note the failures of the risk management 
regime here because they implicate regulation by hypothetical, which 
is an outgrowth of key risk management principles. For example, 
individual firms have been using stress testing for nearly two decades 
as a part of their risk management strategy.137 However, the risk 
management system failed because it did not meet its main objective: 
protecting firms from losses due to unanticipated risks. In other words, 
the models failed to anticipate the risks that brought down the system. 
 132.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL CREATED 
UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS (Oct. 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FAQ%20-
%20FinancialStabilityOversightCouncilOctober2010FINALv2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
32WL-JD8C. 
 133. Financial Stability Oversight Council, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/home.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/M558-
NXAK (last updated Apr. 25, 2013). 
 134.  OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Guidelines for Certain Large Insured 
National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches; 
Integration of CFR Parts 30 and 170, 79 FR 4282-01 (proposed Jan. 27, 2014), available at 
http://occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2014/nr-occ-2014-4a.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/HV7U-X3S2. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, RISK GOVERENANCE: VISUAL MEMORANDUM ON 
GUIDELINES PROPOSED BY THE OCC (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.dpw.com/sites/default/files/ 
Risk.Governance.Visual.Memorandum.on_.Guidelines.Proposed.by_.the_.OCC_.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5GYX-8DZA.  
 137. MARIO QUAGLIARIELLO, STRESS-TESTING THE BANKING SYSTEM 18 (2009). 
1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/7/2014 12:15 PM
1278 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:5:1247 
“They failed Keynes’ test—that it is better to be roughly right than 
precisely wrong. With hindsight, these models were both very precise 
and very wrong.”138 After the crisis, it seems that all risk modeling, 
including internal stress testing, was an unequivocal failure.139 And 
modeling and stress testing not only failed by not preventing the 
financial crisis, they failed because, like Orpheus’s harp, they lulled 
regulators and firms alike into contented tranquility that all was well. 
Many insightful commentators have identified problems with 
the risk management system in general and firm-run stress testing 
specifically.140 The financial system readily admits that its risk 
modeling missed the mark: “A survey of 500 risk managers by KPMG 
in October [2008] found that 92% intended to review their risk 
management practices.”141 Generally, risk management might be 
criticized as a futile exercise that attempts to control the 
uncontrollable. Although this is not to say that it is useless. Indeed, 
risk management can give the firm a lot of useful information about 
its potential vulnerabilities. But it cannot be overrelied on as the 
antidote to risk. Specifically, three shortcomings of the risk 
management system—“black-swan bias,” the system’s failure to 
account for systemic risk, and the problematic incentives the system 
creates—are outlined below. 
a. Modeling for the Future Based on the Past 
In their attempt to predict the future, risk management models 
can be shortsighted. Namely, they suffer from two related phenomena: 
“black-swan bias” and “disaster myopia.” In 2007, Nassim Taleb’s book 
Fooled by Randomness explained the “black swan theory,” which refers 
to events that are outliers, have an extreme impact, and can only be 
 138. Haldane, supra note 5, at 2.  
 139. J.V. Rizzi, Stress Tests Failed the Public, AM. BANKER (Mar. 20, 2013, 11:50 AM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/stress-tests-failed-the-public-1057668-1.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y792-LC7L; Til Schuermann, The Fed’s Stress Tests Add Risk to the 
Financial System, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2013, 7:08 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424127887324532004578362543899602754.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BX45-
299C. 
 140.  SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, RISK MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL BANKING 
CRISIS OF 2008 26 (2009). 
 141. Haldane, supra note 5, at 5; see also Inadequate Risk Management Models Continue to 
Expose the Global Financial System to Great Risks, MARKETWIRED.COM (Apr. 19, 2010, 12:01 
AM) (finding that “[c]urrent quantitative risk management models simply do not work in 
practice . . . .”), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/inadequate-risk-management-
models-continue-expose-global-financial-system-great-1169041.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
LC8T-3Z2D.  
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predicted or explained after they have occurred.142 Black-swan events 
cannot be predicted but are incredibly consequential. History is 
littered with such unanticipated events, but people do not prepare for 
them because black-swan events represent large deviations from the 
norm. Taleb’s theory proved quite prescient; in 2007, he wrote at 
length about the financial system’s failure to predict and prepare for 
risk: “Go ask your portfolio manager for his definition of ‘risk,’ ” and 
odds are that he will supply you with a measure that excludes the 
possibility of the Black Swan—hence one that has no better predictive 
value for assessing the total risks than astrology.”143 
The underlying problem, then, for risk management models is 
that any model that uses past events to predict the probability of future 
events suffers from a black-swan bias. For example, many risk models 
prior to 2005 did not account for the possibility of a precipitous decline 
in national housing prices.144 The models instead accounted for 
inflation risk (which the market experienced in the 1970s and 1980s) 
and other recessionary events, such as stock market declines.145 In 
analyzing why stress testing failed, the Basel Committee blamed the 
use of “historical statistical relationships to assess risk.”146 “They 
assume that risk is driven by a known and constant statistical 
process—i.e., they assume that historical relationships constitute a 
good basis for forecasting the development of future risks. The crisis 
has revealed serious flaws with relying solely on such an approach.”147 
This is not to say that historical risks should not be modeled 
and prepared for, lest history repeat itself in catastrophic ways. 
Markets are cyclical, and events such as high unemployment, inflation, 
and low GDP occur with each recession. It is imperative that firms and 
regulators model and prepare for these events as they are likely to 
recur periodically. However, those events are lagging indicators of a 
problem. The real challenge is recognizing bubbles that cause 
 142. NASSIM N. TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND 
IN THE MARKETS 26 (2005).  
 143. Nassim N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 22, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/books/chapters/0422-1st-
tale.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/XCH7-G3AY. 
 144.  Why Economists Failed to Predict the FINANCIAL Crisis, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 
13, 2009), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-economists-failed-to-predict-the-
financial-crisis/, archived at http://perma.cc/4LMH-74TE. 
 145. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial 
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 53 (2009) (noting Citigroup’s failure to account for a “national 
housing downturn”); Dangers of Delegating, supra note 86, at 4 (discussing models using 
“historical data to calculate probabilities of future risk”).  
 146.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 67, at 3. 
 147.  Id. 
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irrationality and overvaluation, and identifying risks taken on the 
assumption that a certain event could not occur. Not all crises are 
created by bubbles,148 but firms are often more vulnerable to 
overextension during a boom. And as others have thoroughly 
documented, bubbles are vexingly difficult to identify when one is in 
the midst of a bubble.149 
Not only is it difficult to predict and prepare for black swans, 
but it is also difficult to imagine a severe crisis when one has not 
occurred in the recent past. Andrew Haldane labels this phenomenon 
“Disaster Myopia”—that is, “the agents’ propensity to underestimate 
the probability of adverse outcomes, in particular small probability 
events from the distant past.”150 While all bubbles and busts display 
similar patterns, each crisis has a unique and unprecedented trigger. 
In other words, while we repeatedly make faulty assumptions (like 
underestimating unprecedented risks), we never make the same faulty 
assumption twice—once we have experienced a national decline in 
housing prices, we can imagine it happening again. 
Shortsightedness in risk management can be described as a 
problem of either scale or scope. Did previous forms of risk 
management fail because they did not test against sufficiently adverse 
degrees of stress (scale) or because they failed to account for low-
probability events (scope)? The answer has large implications for the 
viability of regulation by hypothetical because a problem of scale can 
more easily be addressed (and the FRB attempted to test firms against 
“severely adverse” scenarios in the latest round of stress testing151) 
than a problem of scope (because it will always be difficult to account 
for the unimaginable).152 
 148.  See Claudio Borio, Change and Consistency in the Financial System: Implications for 
Financial Distress and Policy, in THE STRUCTURE AND RESILIENCE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
(Christopher Kent & Jeremy Lawson eds., 2007), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/ 
publications/confs/2007/pdf/borio.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/638S-AQ27 (“[T]he most classic 
source of financial distress [is the] overextension in risk taking and balance sheets in good times, 
masked by the veneer of a vibrant economy.”). 
 149.  CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005); GERDING, supra note 93 (discussing the hypothesis 
that the economic climate surrounding bubbles causes a weakening of the financial regulation 
that would potentially avert a crisis). 
 149.  Haldane, supra note 5, at 6. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2013 4 
(2013). 
 152.  The Basel Committee takes an optimistic view toward the fixability of stress testing 
emphasizing that firms should use more severe crisis simulations. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, supra note 67, at 4–5. Basel also suggests that the stress testing lacked some scope 
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b. Accounting for System-Wide Problems 
The financial system’s complexity and interconnectedness is 
unprecedented, making it extremely difficult for an individual firm to 
predict and manage systemic risk using models. Firms are exposed not 
only to the risk that their counterparties might face but also to the 
risks confronted by their counterparties’ counterparties. Individual 
firms, therefore, are susceptible to many risks that they cannot control 
or account for in their models. This problem could be addressed by 
more regulatory involvement in risk management. Regulators are able 
to collect information from more market players in order to measure 
systemic vulnerabilities. Dodd-Frank formed FSOC to identify risks 
across the financial sector,153 but it is too soon to determine the 
Counsel’s success. In addition, as discussed below, stress testing with 
an eye toward measuring systemic risk could counter individual firm 
myopia. 
c. Incentives 
Proper risk modeling must incentivize firms to envision and 
prepare for the worst-case scenario. However, individual firms are 
unlikely to forgo high profits in favor of caution, especially when their 
counterparties are engaged in highly leveraged markets. During the 
recent financial crisis, for example, many troubled firms entered the 
subprime market because their counterparties were making large 
profit margins on these high-risk products, such as Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, Credit Default Swaps, and Collateralized Debt Obligations. 
Citibank CEO, Charles O. Prince, put the point this way: “[A]s long as 
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.”154 
Bailouts for TBTF firms also pose problematic incentives. 
Indeed, the more a bank stands to lose, the more likely it is to be bailed 
out—“if a bank owes a small amount it is their problem, a large amount 
it is the authorities [sic].”155 Therefore, large banks like Citibank will 
not be rewarded for avoiding risky markets that their counterparties 
are engaged in for a few reasons: (1) they will be sacrificing the high 
profits going to their competitors; (2) due to the interconnected market, 
and should have considered other types of risk—such as contractual or reputation risks in order 
to be more effective. 
 153.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 132. 
 154. Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing,’ DEALBOOK (July 10, 2007, 10:54 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/citi-chief-on-buyout-loans-were-still-dancing/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/T5WG-DMZZ. 
 155. Haldane, supra note 5, at 12. 
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they will suffer from the failures of their counterparties in any event; 
and (3) because of their size, they will likely be bailed out in the event 
of their own failure. In short, moral hazard is a significant problem.156 
There is also an important incentive problem within a bank 
itself. Many risk managers are not incentivized to run truly revelatory 
stress tests because if their firms’ weaknesses are exposed, the risk 
managers lose bonuses and regulators would intervene—again leading 
to lower bonuses.157 Therefore, stress testing “was not being 
meaningfully used to manage risk. Rather, it was being used to 
manage regulation. . . . [It] was not so much regulatory arbitrage as 
regulatory camouflage.”158 
III. DODD-FRANK’S NEW STRAIN OF REGULATION—REGULATING  
BY HYPOTHETICAL 
The regulation by hypothetical regime is an extension of the 
risk management regime, with the added twist of governmental 
approval. I have described regulation by hypothetical as a new strain 
of regulation not because the methodology of testing balance sheets to 
future hypotheticals is novel, but because hypothetical analysis is now 
mandated and managed by government officials and results in 
regulatory responses, such as mandated capital enhancements, firm 
restructuring, or other remedial measures. Prior to Dodd-Frank, risk 
management was an internal firm affair with limited regulatory 
oversight—regulators oversaw the firm’s risk management practices 
but did not independently gauge risk in any serious way. Dodd-Frank 
introduces, for the first time, a regulator-run process of measuring risk 
at both entity and systemic levels using the regulators’ own models 
and tests. This new regime, which uses hypothetical future scenarios 
to test firm strength, is manifest in two of the most important 
mandates of Dodd-Frank: stress testing and living wills. 
The Sections below consider both of these new agency oversight 
tools in depth and situate them in the latest regulatory regime: 
regulation by hypothetical. This new regime, like all other regulatory 
 156.  PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 63 
(2009) (“[While] ‘moral hazard’ has its origins in the insurance industry . . . [e]ventually the term 
came to refer to any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to 
take, while the other person bears the cost if things go badly.”); see Peter L. Bernstein, The Moral 
Hazard Economy, 87 HARV. BUS. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 101 (2009); See also William A. Lovett, 
Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365, 
1367 (1989) (discussing a parallel example of moral hazard in the case of First Republic Bank in 
the late 1980s). 
 157. Haldane, supra note 5, at 12–13.  
 158. Id. at 13.  
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innovations, was created to modernize a supervisory structure that 
struggles to keep pace with a rapidly changing banking landscape.  
A. Stress Tests 
The term “stress test” is borrowed from the engineering and 
medical world. The most common diagnostic medical test stress test 
involves use of electrocardiogram (EKG) and blood tests to determine 
the heart’s ability to withstand external stress, which is induced by 
heavy exercise or use of targeted drugs.159 The test is meant to assess 
vulnerability or weakness in the heart by exposing it to adverse 
conditions. The theory is that pushing the heart to the edge will enable 
a doctor to distinguish a diseased and compromised heart from a 
healthy one. The doctor can then use preventative care or ex ante 
intervention to avoid heart failure. Financial stress tests are meant to 
work the same way: by exposing a financial company to external stress, 
regulators are able to assess weaknesses or vulnerabilities in 
institutions. One important difference between a cardiac stress test 
and a financial stress test, which will be elaborated more fully below, 
is that the external stress that is placed on the heart is actual stress; 
the heart must actually work harder and pump more blood when an 
individual runs on a treadmill. In contrast, financial stress tests 
involve merely hypothetical exercises that expose bank balance sheets 
to various adverse “what-if” scenarios. Because financial stress tests 
do not cause actual financial distress, their diagnostic value is reduced. 
Financial firms started using their own stress testing in the 
mid-1980s as part of their internal risk management structure. During 
this time, some regulators also began to conduct targeted stress tests 
on a few firms.160 The Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety 
and Soundness Act of 1992 (“FHEFSSA”) required the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”) to conduct a periodic stress 
test to measure risk in Government Sponsored Entities (“GSEs”): 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.161 Although these tests have been 
ongoing, they failed (to say the least) in predicting the catastrophic 
insolvencies of both these entities.162 This failure was attributable to 
 159.  See, e.g., Exercise Stress Test, MEDLINE PLUS (June 18, 2012), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/ 
medlineplus/ency/article/003878.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/9D34-DBR3. 
 160. For an analysis of the history of stress testing, see Weber, supra note 17, at 2280–84. 
 161.  Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 §§ 1311, 1361, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4511, 
4611 (2012). 
 162. While the OFHEO supervised these GSEs, it  
was required to develop a risk-based capital regulation based on a stress test. The 
model and risk-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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shortcomings in the testers’ model, which used historical data in their 
hypothetical scenarios, as well as the success of the GSEs in 
persuading their regulators to minimize “stress” situations to avoid 
increased capital requirements that they argued would reduce their 
return on equity.163 
Financial firms’ adoption of stress testing can be linked to Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM), a large hedge fund that achieved 
phenomenal success for a time by using highly leveraged investments 
based on mathematical models of risk.164 The firm was supposed to 
represent the future of finance: using complex models, specifically the 
Nobel Prize–winning Scholes-Merton model, to ward off risks.165  
At the same time as returns were being boosted by bigger balance sheets and financed 
by higher leverage, risk was being held in check by a shift in the technological frontier 
of risk management. A new era had dawned, one with simultaneously higher return and 
owing to the struggles of the new agency, the complexity of the stress test, and the 
????????? ??????????? ????? ??????? ??? ????????? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ???????? ?????????
institutions viewed as crucial to the U.S. housing sector. Nevertheless, once in effect, 
the stress test was hailed as “state of the art” and as a mechanism to ensure that the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could meet the OFHEO risk-based capital stress test, 
their risk of insolvency was “effectively zero.”  
W. SCOTT FRAME, CHRISTOPHER GERARDI & PAUL S. WILLEN, SUPERVISORY STRESS TESTS, MODEL 
RISK, AND MODEL DISCLOSURE: LESSONS FROM THE OFHEO 2 (2013); see also JOHN WEICHER, 
REFORM OF THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM 3 (2010) (“[T]he new financial safety and soundness 
regulator (OFHEO) spent more than five years putting it in place and evaluating the GSEs. Then 
it turned out that the enacted stress test was so weak that the required capital level to be 
‘adequately capitalized’ was less than the 2.5% minimum capital . . . .”). 
 163. Weber describes the reasons for the failure of these stress tests:  
(1) OFHEO, [the regulator], not the GSEs, is responsible for conducting the test so no 
local knowledge is harnessed and corporate governance is unaffected; (2) the test is 
applied with respect to the GSEs’ asset portfolios as they exist at a fixed point in time; 
(3) the variables that are stressed and, in many cases, the methodologies by which 
they are stressed, are also fixed, specified in FHEFSSA itself; (4) the stress scenarios 
are drawn from historical precedents, meaning that the stress test assumes, at least 
with respect to any single variable, that the worst is in the past; (5) variables are 
isolated and they do not interact dynamically; and (6) the outcome of the test is a 
binary pass-fail verification that does not prompt further action. Moreover, by tying 
the stress test exercise directly to a capital adequacy regime that required compliance 
with precise rules, Congress entrenched an adversarial, top-down regulatory 
relationship. OFHEO’s responses to the GSEs’ comments, published in the Federal 
Register, reflect a consistently adversarial relationship in which the GSEs, perceiving 
that increases to capital requirements would reduce their return on equity, advocated 
at nearly every juncture for the attenuation of the stressed conditions used in the tests. 
“Stress” was a periodically negotiated event rather than a continuous subject of 
deliberation within the firm and between the firm and its regulators. During these 
one-off negotiations, the regulator was deliberating on stressed conditions, and the 
regulated entity minimized threats in order to achieve lower capital requirements. 
Weber, supra note 17, at 2283–84. 
 164.  Xiaowei Guo, The Fall of Long-Term Capital Management, 1 J. BANKING, FIN. & ECON. 
1, 2–3 (2008). 
 165.  Id. 
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lower risk. This miracle came care of a compelling combination of cavalier risk-takers 
and roundhead risk-managers. Or so ran the rhetoric.166  
However, their modeling failed. In 1998, the firm lost $4.6 billion in 
four months due to bad investments in Asian markets. The FRB bailed 
out the fund. It was the first TBTF firm bailed out by the federal 
government, with more to come.167 
During this era of high leverage and high profits, regulators 
mostly stayed on the sidelines. Any regulatory involvement with stress 
testing during this time involved regulators recommending that firms 
conduct them. For example, in 1993, the OCC, faced with the 
proliferation of complex derivatives transactions, directed bank 
management to “facilitate stress testing” in order to “evaluate risk 
exposures under various scenarios that represent a broad range of 
potential market movements and corresponding price behaviors and 
that consider historical and recent market trends.”168 
The next year, the Basel Committee recommended the use of 
stress testing to assess the effect on bank balance sheets of 
hypothetical future adverse events.169 Basel II again required banks to 
have in place “sound stress testing practices” that identify 
“unfavorable effects on a bank’s credit exposures.”170 Even so, in 2006, 
during the early phase of the financial crisis, an FRB survey of bank 
stress-testing practices found that “there was neither a well-developed 
set of best practices nor supervisory guidance in this area at the 
time.”171 The study concluded:  
[N]one of the institutions had an integrated stress testing program that incorporated all 
major financial risks enterprise-wide, nor did they test for scenarios that would render 
 166. Haldane, supra note 5, at 4. 
 167. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement: What Led to the Financial Meltdown, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-
t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/X2ZH-9DPQ. 
 168. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR NO. 277, RISK 
MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1993). The OCC followed up in 1996 with another 
push toward stress testing designed to “evaluate the bank’s exposure in a highly stressed market 
scenario.” OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BULLETIN 1996-43, CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES (1996), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/1996/bulletin-
1996-43.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PF8B-JLRL. 
 169. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR 
DERIVATIVES ¶ III.6 (1994), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc211.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RS8Y-KP5Z. 
 170. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra, note 67, at 96.  
 171. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-499T, FINANCIAL REGULATION: REVIEW OF 
REGULATORS’ OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE, 
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 23 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-
499T, archived at http://perma.cc/32SK-8QBV.  
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them insolvent. [Instead,] institutions were stress testing the impact of adverse events 
on individual products and business lines rather than on the institution as a whole.172  
Federal Reserve officials stated that “the current crisis had gone 
beyond what they had contemplated for a worst-case scenario, 
and . . . that they would probably have faced significant resistance had 
they tried to require the institutions to do stress tests for scenarios 
such as downgrades in counterparties’ credit ratings because such 
scenarios appeared unlikely.”173 
Dodd-Frank, for the first time, codifies stress tests of financial 
institutions as a mandatory and recurrent feature of bank supervision. 
The regulatory purpose of these tests is two-fold. First, they are 
diagnostic. According to the Federal Reserve, these tests “are intended 
to provide BHC management and boards of directors, the public, and 
supervisors with forward-looking information to help identify 
downside risks and the potential effect of adverse conditions on capital 
adequacy of these large banking organizations.”174 Second, the stress 
tests’ results will drive the design of future regulation. The FRB states 
that stress testing is “a valuable supervisory tool that provides a 
forward-looking assessment of large financial institutions’ capital 
adequacy under hypothetical economic and financial market 
conditions.”175 
As mentioned above, prior to passage of the Act, stress testing 
in banks was, at most, recommended by regulators but conducted by 
the banks themselves. Dodd-Frank now requires the Federal Reserve 
to perform stress tests of systemically important firms.176 The FRB’s 
new regulation YY—referred to as “Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests” or 
“DFASTs”—was codified in 2011 and requires the FRB to conduct 
annual stress testing of “covered companies.”177 Covered companies 
include banks with consolidated assets over $50 billion and FSOC-
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 23–24. 
 174. FED. RESERVE, DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2013: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 3 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_20130314.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3PG3-PJGU. 
 175. Official Board Commentary on Regulation II, 12 C.F.R. § 252 app. A (2014). 
 176. The Dodd-Frank Act requires all financial companies that have more than $10 billion in 
total consolidated assets and are regulated by a federal financial regulatory agency to conduct 
capital stress tests at least annually. The Federal Reserve finalized those requirements for BHCs 
with between $10 billion and $50 billion in assets and state member banks and savings and loan 
holding companies with over $10 billion in assets on October 9, 2012. See 12 C.F.R § 252.132 
(2014).  
 177.  Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests, THE FEDERAL RESERVE (June 17, 2014), http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/dfa-stress-tests.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/FC2F-
2ZD3. 
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designated “systemically significant” institutions.178 Dodd-Frank also 
mandates that covered companies conduct their own semiannual 
stress tests using the same scenarios assessed by the FRB itself, and a 
“mid-cycle” stress test using other adverse scenarios.179 The FRB 
conducted its first tests in April 2009. In 2011 and in 2012, the FRB 
conducted a Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR), 
which was similar to a stress test but with a narrower focus of 
determining whether the firms had enough capital to withstand an 
adverse economic scenario.180 Full-scale FRB stress testing occurred 
again in 2013.181 
During the tests, the Federal Reserve posited adverse financial 
scenarios that included lowered housing prices, increased 
unemployment, and a dip in the GDP, among other factors.182 These 
scenarios were intended to highlight vulnerabilities in each firm and 
to ensure that firms had enough Tier 1 capital to buffer their potential 
losses without becoming insolvent.183 Firms that failed the tests were 
required to raise more capital either on the private market or through 
arrangements made with the FRB itself.184 
The stress tests were envisioned as a diagnostic endeavor to 
determine which firms could withstand the next crisis and which could 
not. However, the tests and their results quickly became a way for the 
Federal Reserve to calm the markets and restore confidence in the 
banking system, which is a major aspect of the FRB’s dual role.185 
Thus, in 2009, after the first round of stress tests, the FRB publicized 
 178. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a) & (i)(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 252.132(e). 
 179. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.144(b); id. § 252.145(b); Supervisory and Company-Run Stress Test 
Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,378, 62,387 (Oct. 12, 2012) (“For the 
annual stress test, covered companies will use the same scenarios as the Board will use for its 
supervisory stress analysis.”). 
 180.  Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review, THE FEDERAL RESERVE (June 24, 2014), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ccar.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/4SFA-HKCK. 
 181.  Press Release, The Fed. Reserve, Stress Test Methodology and Results (Mar. 7, 2013), 
available at, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130307a.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8RXQ-NF7B. 
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Alexander Abramovich, Comparative Analysis of Stress Testing in the United States and 
Europe, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 333, 338–39 (2011). See generally Andru E. Wall, Stress Tests & 
Market Discipline, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1 (2011) (analyzing whether 
transparent bank stress tests can improve market conduct). 
 185. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: STRESS TESTING AND SHORING 
UP BANK CAPITAL 10-26, B-1 (2009); Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, U.S. Government Offers 
Details of Bank Stress Test, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/ 
business/economy/26banks.html?_r=0, archived at http:// perma.cc/Y9R9-5EDG. 
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the results, though not the methodology.186 The market quickly 
reacted, and the stock price of each of the passing firms increased, 
some by as much as ninety-five percent.187 Releasing the methodology 
of the stress tests would make the tests more effective by allowing 
industry experts to expose weaknesses in the models. However, if the 
methodology was released and criticized by experts, the market-
calming objective would not be met. In the alternative, regulators could 
conduct stress tests and not release the results at all, which would not 
calm markets but could lead to more rigorous stress testing geared 
toward diagnosing weakness. 
B. SCAP vs. CCAR 
The FRB has conducted two “Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Programs” (“SCAPs”) exercises thus far: one in 2009 and one in 
2013.188 In addition, the FRB conducted two Comprehensive Capital 
Analysis and Reviews (“CCARs”) in 2011 and 2012.189 According to the 
FRB, SCAP was designed to “help[ ] bank supervisors measure 
whether a Bank Holding Company (‘BHC’) has enough capital to 
support its operations throughout periods of stress.”190 The CCAR is “a 
supervisory assessment by the Federal Reserve of the capital planning 
processes and capital adequacy of large, complex, bank holding 
companies.” Furthermore, it is “the central element of the Federal 
 186. The FRB has released the rough outlines of its testing methodology and has explained 
that it used its own models in determining outcomes. However, the FRB has not released the 
details of its models or how those models were applied to individual banks. 
 187. Wall, supra, note 184, at 1–2 (noting that credit default swap spreads also increased for 
four banks, indicating more confidence in the banks as a result of the stress tests). 
 188.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf; archived at http://perma.cc/ 4UQD-VBFP [hereinafter SCAP 
DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE 
CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2013: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS (2013), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ccar-2013-results-20130314.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/U9WU-8HVW [hereinafter 2013 CCAR ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK].  
 189. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra, note 188; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW: OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW, 
(2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20110318a1.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5LX4-32T6 [hereinafter 2011 CCAR OBJECTIVES]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2012: METHODOLOGY AND 
RESULTS FOR STRESS SCENARIO PROJECTIONS (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20120313a1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JHQ3-K9HF 
[hereinafter 2012 CCAR METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS]; 2013 CCAR ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK, 
supra, note 188.  
 190.  FED. RESERVE, DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2014: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 1 (2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/nesevents/ 
press/bcreg/bcreg20140320a1.pdf, archived at http:// perma.cc/524T-UGG8.  
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Reserve’s approach to ensuring that large BHCs have thorough and 
robust processes for managing their capital resources, supported by 
effective risk measurement and risk management practices.”191 The 
SCAP and CCAR are similar in purpose, and starting in 2014, the 
CCAR Program will be subsumed into the 2014 Capital Plan Review 
program, which will apply in an identical manner to all covered 
companies.192  
Although both exercises measure the same thing (capital 
adequacy) at the same firms (large BHCs), they function in different 
ways. Within the framing of hypothetical regulation, SCAPs fit into 
the new frontier of regulator-designed hypothetical testing, and CCAR 
is only an extension of already functioning risk management protocols. 
For SCAP, “the Federal Reserve uses a standardized set of capital 
action assumptions that are specified in the Dodd-Frank stress test 
rules,” which are created by the regulator.193 
In measuring how firm balance sheets will react to hypothetical 
stress, both exercises use a common formula across firms that is based 
on what similar firms have done in the past.194 The FRB takes this 
approach because it admits that future capital actions are 
“uncertain.”195 For the CCAR, the FRB uses a BHC’s own planned 
capital actions to assess whether the “BHC would be capable of 
meeting supervisory expectations for minimum capital ratios if 
stressful conditions emerged.”196 In other words, with SCAP, the FRB 
 191.  2012 CCAR METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS, supra note 189, at 4.  
 192.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS 
AND REVIEW 2014: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE 1–2 (2013) [hereinafter 2014 CCAR 
INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ 
bcreg20131101a2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9TWY-92T7. 
 193. BD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND 
REVIEW 2014: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 21, box 3 (2014), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcred/ccar20140326.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/NY7Y-45W9.  
 194. Id. The formula assumes that common stock dividends are consistent from last year, 
scheduled payments on capital instruments “eligible for inclusion in the numerator of a 
regulatory capital ratio” are paid, and there are no repurchases of common stock. Finally, the 
assumptions do not factor in issuances “of new common stock, preferred stock, or other 
instrument that would be included in regulatory capital, except for common stock issuance 
associated with expensed employee compensation.” Id. at 21 box 3 & n.2.  
 195. See id. (“[F]uture capital actions . . . will not be reflected in a company’s projected 
regulatory capital for the purpose of the company-run stress tests because of the uncertainty of 
these actions.”). 
 196. Id. at box 3. The FRB states that the CCAR “focuses on the risk management and 
management practices supporting organizations’ capital adequacy assessments, including their 
ability to deliver credible inputs to their loss estimation techniques, as well as the governance 
processes around capital planning practices.” Policy Statement on the Scenario Design 
Framework for Stress Testing, 12 C.F.R. § 252 app. A (2014). 
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predicts how capital might be used and depleted while, with CCARs, it 
defers to the firms’ own statements and plans to determine whether 
capital will remain sufficient. This Article focuses on SCAPs because 
they represented an unalloyed adoption of regulation by hypothetical. 
C. SCAP Methodology 
The FRB designed SCAP to collect as much information as 
possible about each firm’s loss rates and resource availability, thereby 
illuminating potential losses and revenues for weaker-than-expected 
economic conditions.197 The first SCAP implementation involved over 
150 examiners and economists.198 For this first round of SCAP testing 
in 2009, the selected BHCs estimated potential losses on a variety of 
assets and trading positions199 under two alternative macroeconomic 
scenarios. The BHCs also projected the resources they believed were 
available to absorb losses over two years under both macroeconomic 
scenarios.200 
Teams of regulators evaluated categories of assets, revenues, 
and reserves, and “engaged with the firms . . . to obtain additional 
information necessary to support the firms’ estimates.”201 These 
regulators also reviewed and evaluated each firm’s quantitative 
methods, which the firms had used to project losses and resources to 
create key assumptions.202 The FRB took these actions to create a 
picture of each firm’s portfolio, underwriting practices, and risk 
management practices, although no actual interviews or evaluations 
of individuals at the firms were conducted.203 To ensure consistency 
across all firms, the teams used a single, unitary quantitative method 
to evaluate all the firms’ estimates.204 
 197.  SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 11. 
 198.  The Federal Reserve released a white paper describing the methodology and 
implementation of its SCAP program. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Board Publishes White Paper on Process and Methodologies Employed by Federal Banking 
Supervisory Agencies in Capital Assessment of Large U.S. Bank Holding Companies (Apr. 24, 
2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090424a.htm 
archived at, http://perma.cc/QXF7-DPLB. 
 199. Such as “loans, securities, and trading positions, as well as pre-provision net revenue 
(PPNR) and the resources available from the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL).” SCAP 
DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 4. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id.  
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In 2009, the FRB team used two scenarios to conduct the stress 
tests: a baseline scenario and a more adverse scenario.205 The two 
scenarios were meant to mimic recessionary conditions and took into 
account general macroeconomic factors, with an emphasis on local 
housing prices because of banks’ recent, heavy mortgage lending. The 
baseline projection built on forecasts made in 2009 by a group of 
professional economists that reflected their “consensus view about the 
depth and duration of the recession.”206 The more adverse scenario was 
not intended to be a realistic assessment of what would likely happen, 
but rather what could happen if the recession was longer and deeper 
than anticipated. The more adverse scenario “reflected the possibility 
that the economy could turn out to be appreciably weaker than 
expected under the baseline outlook.”207 The FRB designed the test to 
“reflect conditions that are severe but plausible.”208 
The firms’ balance sheets were divided into several categories 
and the banks were asked to estimate their projected losses under all 
of the selected classes of loans, under both the baseline and more 
adverse scenarios.209 The FRB determined projected losses using a 
 205. See id. at 5 (describing the two scenarios). 
 206. Id. The baseline scenario was consistent with projections from the Consensus Forecasts, 
the Blue Chip survey, and the Survey of Professional Forecasters, and was designed to show a 
consensus of the recession’s duration and depth. In addition, the FRB states that “the 
assumptions for house prices in the baseline economic outlook are consistent with the path that 
was implied by future prices for the Case-Shiller 10-city Composite index in late February and 
the average response to a special question on house prices in the Blue Chip survey.” Id. However, 
for the more adverse scenario, house prices were held to be ten percent lower at the end of 2010. 
Id. 
 207. Id. The Federal Reserve never claimed its economic predictions would be inerrant, 
instead contending the predictions could be helpful to get a broad view of risk. See id. at 10 (“The 
future path of GDP growth, unemployment, and home prices . . . are unknown, with a wide range 
of plausible outcomes . . . this type of exercise can be extremely useful in helping . . . understand 
a BHC’s risk, especially in periods of high uncertainty.”); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 2 
(2009) (“The estimates are not forecasts or expected outcomes; they are the product of a two-year-
ahead ‘what if’ exercise . . . .”).  
 208. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 5. The FRB report states that:  
The “more adverse” scenario was constructed from the historical track record of 
private forecasters as well as their current assessments of uncertainty. In particular, 
based on the historical accuracy of Blue Chip forecasts made since the late 1970s, the 
likelihood that the average unemployment rate in 2010 could be at least as high as in 
the alternative more adverse scenario is roughly [ten] percent. In addition, the 
subjective probability assessments provided by participants in the January Consensus 
Forecasts survey and the February Survey of Professional Forecasters imply a roughly 
[fifteen] percent change that real GDP growth could be at least as low, and 
unemployment at least as high, as assumed in the more adverse scenario.  
Id. at 5 n.3.  
 209. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 12–15. The supervisory teams, 
made up of “senior examiners, economists, and financial analysts,” compiled data into five 
distinct categories: (1) consumer lending: first and second lien mortgages; credit cards and other 
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variety of methods but mainly analyzed historical losses experienced 
at large BHCs.210 The FRB report admits the drawbacks of relying on 
historical models for housing losses, noting that “historical loss 
experience at BHCs may not be a reliable guide to future performance 
under the baseline or more adverse scenario, given the path of home 
prices in recent years.”211 The statement doesn’t address why historical 
loss experience has predictive value for any of the other categories. 
The second round of SCAP, executed in 2013, tracked the FRB’s 
2009 approach but added a new requirement that banks run their own 
tests in addition to the Federal Reserve tests.212 In addition—and of 
particular importance to this Article—regulators used a new “severely 
adverse” scenario that, along with the baseline and adverse scenario, 
brought into play more variables than the original 2009 SCAP.213 This 
new methodology was developed in response to criticisms that the 
adverse scenario in 2009 was not adverse enough. The additional 
variables incorporated into the “severely adverse” scenario included 
problems in the E.U. and a deeper recession than was modeled in 
2009.214 In the severely adverse scenario, from the third quarter of 
2012 to the end of 2013, real GDP declines nearly five percent, 
unemployment increases to twelve percent, and the Consumer Price 
Index slows to one percent.215 Equities drop more than fifty percent, 
and equity market volatility increases from twenty-one to seventy.216 
consumer loans; (2) commercial lending: commercial and industrial loans, commercial real estate 
loans; (3) counterparty transactions: securities in AFS and HTM portfolios, trading portfolio 
losses, counterparty credit risk, pre-provision net revenue, and allowances for loan and lease 
losses; (4) net revenue—that is, “net revenue before adjusting for loss provisions”; and (5) in 
allowance for lease and loss gains the teams assessed the level of reserves needed at the end of 
the scenario. Id.; Pre-Provision Net Revenue Definition, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/ 
investing/glossary/p/pre-provision-net-revenue#provision, archived at http://perma.cc/828X-
ATMS. 
 210. FED. RESERVE, supra note 174, at 8.  
 211. Id. 
 212. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 1–5. Another difference is that in 
the 2009 SCAP “[a]ll domestic BHCs with year-end 2008 assets exceeding $100 billion were 
required to participate.” Id. The 2013 SCAP investigated any BHC “with $50 billion or more in 
total consolidated assets and nonbank financial companies designated by the FSOC for Federal 
Reserve supervision.” FED. RESERVE, supra note 174 at 9.  
 213.  FED. RESERVE, supra note 174, at 3–5 (describing the changes).  
 214.  Id. at 7. There were twenty-six variables; fourteen of these variables captured “economic 
activity, asset activity, and interest rates in the U.S. economy,” while the remainder contained 
three variables of “real GDP growth, inflation, and the U.S./foreign currency exchange rate” in 
“the euro area, the United Kingdom, developing Asia, and Japan.” 
 215.  Id. In comparison, under the “more adverse” scenario of the 2009 SCAP, GDP declines 
only 3.3 percent from the end of 2008 to the third quarter of 2009, unemployment rises to 10.3 
percent, and housing prices decline more than 20 percent through 2010. SCAP DESIGN & 
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 6–7. 
 216.  SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, 7. 
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“House prices decline more than 20 percent by the end of 2014, and 
commercial real estate prices fall by a similar amount.”217 Finally, the 
international component “features recessions in the euro area, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan and below-trend growth in developing 
Asia.”218 
In 2014, stress tests revealed an interesting new function. The 
FRB objected to five capital plans. Four of these rejections were on 
qualitative grounds (Citi, RBS, Santander, and HSBC), and one was 
on quantitative grounds (Zions). In explaining the Citigroup failure, 
the FRB reported: 
While Citigroup has made considerable progress in improving its general risk-
management and control practices over the past several years, its 2014 capital plan 
reflected a number of deficiencies in its capital planning practices, including in some 
areas that had been previously identified by supervisors as requiring attention, but for 
which there was not sufficient improvement. Practices with specific deficiencies included 
Citigroup’s ability to project revenue and losses under a stressful scenario for material 
parts of the firm’s global operations, and its ability to develop scenarios for its internal 
stress testing that adequately reflect and stress its full range of business activities and 
exposures. Taken in isolation, each of the deficiencies would not have been deemed 
critical enough to warrant an objection, but, when viewed together, they raise sufficient 
concerns regarding the overall reliability of Citigroup’s capital planning process to 
warrant an objection to the capital plan and require a resubmission.219 
Citi had requested an increase in its dividend from $0.01 to 
$0.05 and a $6.4 billion share repurchase.220 The FRB objected to the 
plans because, among other things, the banks were unable to project 
losses and revenues under stress scenarios.221 So the FRB actually 
restricted distributions based on a procedural objection to their stress 
testing capabilities. This could be encouraging news that the FRB is 
taking its risk management oversight responsibilities more seriously 
and may have learned its lesson. On the other hand, the stress tests 
are not only about disclosure—they also activate real levers of state 
power. Now, well-capitalized BHCs can distribute property to 
stockholders (even to preferred stockholders) only with FRB approval, 
which had never been the case before. Dividends have been made 
contingent and contestable to an unprecedented degree. Dividend 
restrictions are as old as U.S. banking law. But these restrictions are, 
perhaps, dividend restrictions by hypothetical. This type of restriction 
looks a lot like a central bank overseeing a utility rather than a private 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. at 8. 
 219.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 193, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 220.  Matthew Boesler, Citi Fails Fed Stress Test, Stock Tanks, BUS. INSIDER SINGAPORE 
(Mar. 26, 2014, 4:07 AM), http://www.businessinsider.sg/citi-fails-fed-stress-test-stock-tanks-
2014-3/#.U-fBVhaN6fM, archived at http://perma.cc/XZ4P-HFWU. 
 221.  Id. 
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bank. Could this mean that regulation by hypothetical, if administered 
conservatively, moves regulation towards utility banking? 
D. The Hypothetical 
The foundation of this new regulatory frontier is, of course, a 
hypothetical. In order for a stress test or a living will to accurately 
predict possible outcomes, regulators must present a hypothetical 
scenario that is realistic, thorough, and sufficiently adverse. Firms 
have been constructing hypothetical models for internal risk 
management for decades, and the FRB’s hypothetical was built using 
general industry standards. There are two methods for risk modeling: 
(1) using historical data to build a model for possible adverse outcomes 
and (2) Monte Carlo modeling, which is more of a randomized sampling 
of risk. Historical models are much more prevalent. 
To illustrate the difference, imagine a weather prediction 
scenario. In order to predict and prepare for snowfall in Atlanta in 
February, a historical model predicts future snowfall based on average 
snowfall in the past. In a historically based simulation, firms account 
for risks that have occurred in the past and favor those risks in their 
models. For example, an adverse recessionary hypothetical looks at all 
past recessions and the market events that ensued and includes those 
events in their model in order to determine how well a firm might fare 
if those events occurred again. Regulators can also intensify stressors 
in increasingly adverse scenarios. For example, in a hypothetical 
adverse scenario, unemployment would be nine percent. In a severely 
adverse scenario, unemployment would be twelve percent. Most 
models are considered successful if the severely adverse scenario 
produces larger hypothetical losses than a baseline or adverse 
scenario. However, historical data is limited in that, if an event has 
not happened in the past, the model cannot gauge its effects in the 
future. For example, there is no model that can accurately predict the 
broad market effects of thirty percent unemployment because it is 
historically unprecedented—there is no data for such an event. The 
model would have to assume that the loss would somehow correlate 
with unemployment data that exists. But would thirty percent 
unemployment just result in triple the losses as ten percent 
unemployment, or would it cause a chain reaction across other 
markets, resulting in unprecedented losses in, for example, consumer 
spending, credit, and GDP? 
In Monte Carlo modeling, historical data is still used to define 
the high and low parameters, but a variety of possibilities are chosen 
at random. A computer model randomly chooses among a range of past 
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possibilities, and repeats the process until an adequate sample is 
attained. When modeling for market risks, a Monte Carlo model treats 
all risks as having the same probability or recurrence and runs many 
simulations of possible risks to collect a random sampling of 
possibilities. However, the Monte Carlo model is still limited by 
historical possibilities in inputting data. For example, the model would 
not consider or prepare for a snowfall that has not happened in the 
past—let’s say two feet per day of snowfall for the entire month. Such 
an event could create significant problems, but it would be difficult to 
prepare for them because the event and its aftermath are 
unprecedented. 
Monte Carlo modeling has the advantage of including a bigger 
scope of risk, but it is limited in its predictive ability. The model still 
uses available data for its simulations, it just uses the data differently 
than historically based simulations. For instance, a Monte Carlo model 
could attempt to model thirty percent unemployment, but it could not 
accurately predict the results of such unemployment because, like 
historically based simulation, Monte Carlo modeling operates under 
limited data. Monte Carlo modeling is also much more difficult and 
time-consuming because it has to generate many scenarios in order to 
have a large enough data sample. Thus, most firm models use 
historical data, and therefore, most firm models cannot accurately 
predict scenarios that have not happened historically. 
This is the significant problem of the hypothetical regime: it can 
prepare firms for cyclical market problems, but it cannot prepare them 
for unprecedented market occurrences. This is not to say that these 
hypotheticals are useless but that we need to understand their limits. 
There are many correlations whose modeling is worthwhile. Markets 
are cyclical, and firms must be prepared to withstand run-of-the-mill 
market problems. However, financial crises are usually not caused by 
mundane market occurrences. 
In designing the 2013 SCAP hypothetical, the FRB considered 
historically based simulations and other “probabilistic approaches,” 
such as Monte Carlo, which would “construct a forecast from a large-
scale macroeconomic model and identify a scenario that would have a 
specific probabilistic likelihood.” 222 The FRB publicized its process of 
selecting operative variables. Ultimately, in designing the baseline, 
adverse, and severely adverse hypotheticals, the Federal Reserve 
relied on historical data: 
In general, the baseline scenario will reflect the most recently available consensus views 
of the macroeconomic outlook expressed by professional forecasters, government 
 222. Id.  
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agencies, and other public-sector organizations as of the beginning of the annual stress-
test cycle. The severely adverse scenario will consist of a set of economic and financial 
conditions that reflect the conditions of post-war U.S. recessions. The adverse scenario 
will consist of a set of economic and financial conditions that are more adverse than those 
associated with the baseline scenario but less severe than those associated with the 
severely adverse scenario.”223 
In deciding in favor of the historic approach, the FRB rejected 
the purely mathematical risk modeling approach based on randomly 
generated scenarios, instead adopting a simpler alternative that is less 
complex but inherently limited in scope. The hypotheticals, therefore, 
focus on scenarios that involve recessions of varying degrees that 
resemble past recessions. The FRB explains that a “scenario featuring 
a recession may be somewhat clearer and more straightforward to 
communicate,” and the “probabilistic approach relies on estimates of 
uncertainty around the baseline scenario and such estimates are in 
practice model-dependent.”224 The FRB is in line with the industry in 
their preference of a more realistic, easy-to-administer, historically 
based hypothetical over the more complex Monte Carlo mathematical 
models. 
To counteract the problem of the limited scope of historical 
data, the FRB intends to account for more and more possible risks as 
they present themselves in real time. Thus, in addition to the fixed 
scenarios, which are mainly focused on GDP and unemployment risks, 
the FRB states that it will add a “salient risk” category each year that 
will use current conditions to anticipate possible risks to the banking 
sector.225 The FRB admits, however, that this will be difficult when 
 223. Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 12 C.F.R. § 252 
app. A (2014):  
This approach requires consideration of the type of recession to feature. All post-war 
U.S. recessions have not been identical: some recessions have been associated with 
very elevated interest rates, some have been associated with sizable asset price 
declines, and some have been relatively more global. The most common features of 
recessions, however, are increases in the unemployment rate and contractions in 
aggregate incomes and economic activity. For this and the following reasons, the Board 
intends to use the unemployment rate as the primary basis for specifying the severely 
adverse scenario. First, the unemployment rate is likely the most representative single 
summary indicator of adverse economic conditions. Second, in comparison to GDP, 
labor market data have traditionally featured more prominently than GDP in the set 
of indicators that the National Bureau of Economic Research reviews to inform its 
recession dates. Third and finally, the growth rate of potential output can cause the 
size of the decline in GDP to vary between recessions. While changes in the 
unemployment rate can also vary over time due to demographic factors, this seems to 
have more limited implications over time relative to changes in potential output 
growth. The unemployment rate used in the severely adverse scenario will reflect an 
unemployment rate that has been observed in severe post-war U.S. recessions, 
measuring severity by the absolute level of and relative increase in the unemployment 
rate. 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. 
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economic conditions are buoyant as “a boom can obscure the 
weaknesses present in the system.”226 
1. Weakness of Stress Tests 
a. Not Adverse Enough 
Many commenters claimed that the FRB’s 2009 stress tests 
were not stringent enough—with an open question as to whether they 
were purposefully so.227 A 2009 Saturday Night Live sketch mocked 
Tim Geithner’s announcement about the stress test results: 
Initially, my department had planned to give each bank a numerical grade of 1 to 100—
100 being a perfect score. But then we decided that might unfairly stigmatize banks who 
scored low on the test because they followed reckless lending practices or were otherwise 
not good at banking. So we changed to a simple “PASS/FAIL” system. However, on 
reflection, a few of us felt that THAT system was too rigid, so we changed it once again 
to “PASS/PASS.*” This seemed less judgmental and more inclusive. Eventually, at the 
banks’ suggestion, we dropped the asterisk and went with a “PASS/PASS” system. 
Tonight, I am proud to say that, after the written tests were examined, every one of the 
nineteen banks scored a “PASS”! Congratulations, banks! 228 
The question of whether the soft test was on purpose implicates the 
problematic dual role of the FRB as systemic risk regulator as well as 
marketmaker, which involves assuring trust in financial markets. Was 
the intent of the tests to assure markets or to test accurately firm 
vulnerabilities? If regulators view these tests as a means of calming 
the markets, there is an inherent incentive to go light on “adverse” 
conditions. For example, the “more adverse” scenario used in February 
2009, which was billed as being “unlikely,” did not look unlikely at all 
by the fall of 2009.229 These regulatory incentives should not be 
ignored. 
 226. Id.  
 227. David Wessel, Bank Checkup Also Tests Regulators, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2009, 12:01 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123983475012122683.html; see also David Ellis, Watchdog 
Wants Stress Test Do-Over, CNN (June 9, 2009, 6:48 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/09/ 
news/companies/tests_warren/, archived at http://perma.cc/B9S7-T6ZR (“[T]he Congressional 
Oversight Panel pointed to the unemployment report for the month of May as a sign that the 
stress tests were not stressful enough.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Stress Tests are Over. The Stress 
Isn’t, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/business/10gret.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/K3C4-FTZG (“The government tests were, in truth, not exceedingly 
tough. And some of the program’s ‘adverse’ scenarios look more like a day at the beach.”).  
 228. Season 34, Episode 21: A Special Address from the Secretary of the Treasury, SNL 
TRANSCRIPTS, http://snltranscripts.jt.org/08/08ugeithner.phtml, archived at http://perma.cc/R79-
RCHZ (last visited Sept. 3, 2014). 
 229. Ellis, supra note 227 (“[T]he unemployment rate surged to a 26-year high of 9.45. 
Banking regulators that devised the stress tests had said in their most ‘adverse’ case scenario 
that the jobless rate would hit 8.9% in 2009.”).  
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European regulators had similar conflicts that became starkly 
apparent in their stress testing, which was modeled after the FRB 
stress tests. The mismatch of regulatory incentives in the European 
regulators’ stress tests produced such inaccurate results that 
commentators deemed them all but useless. In 2010, the Committee of 
European Bank Supervisors “gave a clean bill of health to all but seven 
of the 91 banks that were tested, identifying an aggregate capital 
shortfall of only €3.5 billion.”230 These test results immediately led to 
a positive market response. However, within four months, two of the 
Irish banks that passed the tests required rescuing by various state 
and international groups, resulting in roughly €35 Billion in capital 
allocations and bailout funds. Dexia, a Franco-Belgian bank, which the 
stress tests suggested was in good shape, in fact was in deep trouble 
just three months later.231 Greek and Spanish banks also passed the 
tests only to fall into unprecedented distress only months later.232 
Cyprian banks passed the E.U. regulator conducted stress tests in 
2010 and 2011 and failed shortly thereafter.233 
One stated reason for these results was that “the tests modeled 
the impact of the economy on loan portfolios but didn’t contemplate the 
possibility that government bonds could produce losses.”234 Failing to 
account for government bond failure was not merely an oversight but 
an illustrative example of the conflicting dual role of regulators who 
are conducting the tests as well as attempting to calm markets. The 
European Banking authority “stopped short of applying market 
 230. Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, Bank Watchdog Sets Out to Square the Circle, FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d70dd886-3865-11e0-959c-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2VMLLyFqf, archived at http://perma.cc/U4W9-6HAA. 
 231.  Greek Debt Crisis Leads to Dexia Bank Failure, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Oct. 11, 2011, 3:00 
PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/11/141246687/greek-debt-crisis-leads-to-dexia-fail, archived at 
http://perma.cc/G82G-XPNN.  
 232. See David Enrich, New Doubts on EU Bank Stress Tests, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 20, 2010, 
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704720004575377202517842246.html. 
 233.  COMM. OF EUR. BANKING SUPERVISORS, AGGREGATE OUTCOME OF THE 2011 E.U.-WIDE 
STRESS TEST EXERCISE COORDINATED BY CEB IN COOPERATION WITH THE ECB: SUMMARY REPORT 
(2011), available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15935/ 
EBA_ST_2011_Summary_Report_v6.pdf/54a9ec8e-3a44-449f-9a5f-e820cc2c2f0a, archived at 
http://perma.cc/M44A-GBQG; COMM. OF EUR. BANKING SUPERVISORS, AGGREGATE OUTCOME OF 
THE 2010 E.U.-WIDE STRESS TEST EXERCISE COORDINATED BY CEB IN COOPERATION WITH THE 
ECB: SUMMARY REPORT (2010), available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15938/ 
Summaryreport.pdf/95030af2-7b52-4530-afe1-f067a895d163, archived at http://perma.cc/JH3X-
T9G4; Landon Thomas Jr., Calculating the Impact of Cyprus’ Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/business/global/calculating-impact-of-cypruss-bank-
bailout.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&, archived at http://perma.cc/BD3-BUE5? 
 234.  David Enrich, Greek Bets Sank Cyprus’s Top Lenders, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2013, 7:35 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323501004578386762342123182.html. 
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valuations of peripheral sovereign debt—precisely the issue that was 
at the heart of investors nervousness about banks’ financial 
strength.”235 This politically driven omission, which was not disclosed, 
resulted in false market signaling that concealed the actual state of 
the E.U. banks. 
b. Snapshot Testing—Too Narrow 
Stress tests are too narrowly focused both on a single static 
point in time and also on a single data point (a firm’s balance sheet). 
Often, a crisis unfolds slowly and firms react to the falling pieces in 
sequence. The stress test takes a single snapshot of a future point in 
time when an adverse scenario suddenly hits a balance sheet. This 
view doesn’t capture the changes that managers could make that 
would affect a balance sheet prior to the full realization of the adverse 
scenario. Relatedly, the test only captures the balance sheet and not 
the reactions of the individuals making decisions about the balance 
sheets: 
Market crises unfold over a period of time, during which market liquidity may dry out. 
Yet most scenario analyses are static in nature, i.e., are one period models and do not 
allow for the trading of positions in an environment where liquidity varies from one 
period to the next. [Such analyses] assume that events occur simultaneously, and that 
the portfolio [being tested] remains constant during the period. The modeling framework 
usually does not allow for dynamic hedging or the unwinding of positions. [They] are, by 
construction, static. Increasing the risk horizon from one day to ten days, one month, or 
one year, does not make the model more dynamic. . . . Clearly, liquidity risk cannot be 
factored into this traditional static framework.236 
In addition, the tests have an admittedly narrow focus on 
certain types of risk. The FRB states that the stress test should focus 
only on “credit risk and market risk—that is, risk of mark-to-market 
losses associated with firms’ trading and counterparty positions—and 
not on other types of risk, such as liquidity risk or operational risk 
unrelated to the macroeconomic environment.”237 
c. Market Subsidies 
There is something particularly troubling about regulators 
using stress tests to calm markets. At best, it is inaccurate—and at 
worst deceptive—to calm markets using an unreleased methodology 
 235. Patrick Jenkins, Why Power Remains Elusive Among the Regulators, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 2011, at 14. 
 236. MICHEL CROUHY ET AL., RISK MANAGEMENT 240–41 (2001). 
 237. Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 77 Fed. Reg. 
70,124, 70,128 (codified with some differences in language at 12 C.F.R. § 252 app. A (2014)).  
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that gives firms a clean bill of health when, in fact, they remain as 
vulnerable as ever to market stress. Such a tactic endangers safety and 
soundness while diminishing incentives for market discipline. But 
what is most troublesome from the standpoint of proper governance is 
that the clean bill of health is akin to federal regulators standing 
behind and insuring these firms. This gesture adds another layer of 
federal subsidy to an already heavily subsidized sector.238 Moral 
hazard is rampant in the postcrisis banking world as the government 
added the promise of implicit bailouts to explicit deposit insurance. 
The stress test regime looks like another layer of government 
insurance for these banks if the market is to rely on a regulator’s 
diagnosis of a stable and safe banking system. 
2. Living Wills 
a. Description of Living Wills 
Living wills are a response to perhaps the most vexing problem 
that emerged from the recent crisis: the realization that certain firms 
were too big to fail. TBTF firms endanger the financial sector because 
they create moral hazard. Specifically, TBTF firms take undue risks to 
generate near-term gains and diminish the capacity of regulators to 
assure safety and soundness. Many industry observers from across the 
political spectrum have claimed that the only effective reform would 
be to break up the banks.239 However, neither Dodd-Frank nor any 
other regulatory measure addresses the “too bigness” of these firms. 
Dodd-Frank attempts to address the “to fail” aspect of the TBTF 
problem. In particular, Dodd-Frank promoted the use of living wills to 
address “the dissatisfaction with widespread bailouts of financial firms 
during the recent global financial crisis.”240 Living wills are designed 
to assure “rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material 
 238.  See Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283 
(2014). 
 239.  Jeff Kearns & Jesse Hamilton, Fed’s Fisher Urges Bank Breakup Amid Too-Big-To-Fail 
‘Injustice,’ BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/fed-s-fisher-
urges-bank-breakup-amid-too-big-to-fail-injustice-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P3L-3JRR; 
Allan Sloan, Are Big Banks Doomed to Fail?, FORTUNE (June 14, 2011, 9:00 AM), 
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/14/are-big-banks-doomed-to-fail/; The Dodd-Frank Act: 
Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21547784, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4FK4-NGCT. 
 240. Adam Feibelman, Living Wills and Pre-Commitment, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 95, 99 
(2012). 
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financial distress or failure.”241 These “wills” are similar to 
“contingency planning for public emergencies that arise when a 
hurricane, earthquake, or other natural disaster strikes.”242 They are 
to be crafted by the firms themselves, subject to review by banking 
regulators.243 
As we have seen, section 165 of Dodd-Frank sets up the 
supervisory structure for “covered companies.”244 These companies are 
to submit to the FRB, the FDIC, and the FSOC resolution plans, which 
must include the following:245 
 
? information regarding the manner and extent to which any 
insured depository institution affiliated with the company 
is adequately protected from risks arising from the 
activities of any nonbank subsidiaries of the company; 
? full descriptions of the ownership structure, assets, 
liabilities, and contractual obligations of the company; 
? identification of the cross-guarantees tied to different 
securities identification of major counterparties, and a 
process for determining to whom the collateral of the 
company is pledges; and 
? any other information that the Board of Governors and the 
Corporation jointly requires by rule or order.246 
 
The gathering of these plans is staggered; the largest banks are 
required to file first, followed by the rest of the banking sector.247 
 241. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 115(d)(1) 12 U.S.C. § 
5365(d)(1) (2012). 
 242. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, CREDIBLE LIVING WILLS: THE FIRST GENERATION, (April 
25, 2011), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/37a3a804-6a6c-4e10-a628-
7a1dbbaece7c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c621815c-9413-436b-91ea-
3451b2b4cf32/042611_DavisPolkMcKinsey_LivingWills_Whitepaper.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/8JEZ-NLAJ. 
 243. Simon Johnson, Why Living Wills Fail, ECONOMIX (June 17, 2010, 6:00 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/why-living-wills-fail/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
7UHY-FB93 (explaining that, in theory, “[n]o one knows their business better than the banks 
themselves . . . so they should have the responsibility for explaining how they can close down 
their various operations—or perhaps sell more valuable parts while limiting losses for 
unprofitable activities”).  
 244. 12 U.S.C. § 5365. Covered companies are nonbank financial companies that are 
supervised by the FRB and bank holding companies with at least $50 billion in assets. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 381.2(f)(1) (2014). 
 245. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(1). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. § 5365(d)(8) requires the FRB and the FDIC to issue final rules implementing Section 
165(d). The first of these rules was released on November 1, 2011. Resolution Plan Required, 12 
CFR § 243.3. The rule staggered the submission of annual resolution plans. Institutions that have 
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Regulators have required that resolution plans include an executive 
summary as well as a strategic analysis “describing the covered 
company’s plan for rapid and orderly resolution in the event of 
material financial distress and failure.”248 In creating “credible” living 
wills, banks must provide a strategic analysis, which should include: 
[D]etailed descriptions of the (i) [k]ey assumptions and supporting analysis underlying 
the covered company’s resolution plan, including any assumptions made concerning the 
economic or financial conditions that would be present at the time the covered company 
sought to implement such plan; (ii) [r]ange of specific actions to be taken by the covered 
company to facilitate a rapid and orderly resolution of the covered company, its material 
entities, and its critical operations and core business lines in the event of material 
financial distress or failure of the covered company; (iii) [f]unding, liquidity and capital 
needs of, and resources available to, the covered company and its material entities, 
which shall be mapped to its critical operations and core business lines, in the ordinary 
course of business and in the event of material financial distress at or failure of the 
covered company; (iv) [c]overed company’s strategy for maintaining operations of, and 
funding for, the covered company and its material entities, which shall be mapped to its 
critical operations and core business lines . . . . 249 
Firms are to devise their plans using the three economic 
scenarios stipulated in the FRB’s stress test analysis: baseline, 
adverse, and severely adverse. However, for the first round of living 
wills, firms were asked only to devise a plan under the baseline 
scenario, or “a reasonable substitute developed by the covered 
company.”250 Consistent with concerns about the TBTF phenomenon, 
firms must devise resolution plans without relying on any government 
funding.251 To streamline submissions, regulators provided baseline 
assumptions during the first wave of filings, which included: (1) no 
reliance on government intervention; (2) an idiosyncratic scenario 
$250 billion or more in total nonbank assets were to submit their living wills by July 1, 2012. 
Institutions with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets were required to submit their 
living wills by July 1, 2013, and the remaining institutions were required to submit their plans 
by December 31, 2013. 
 248. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(8). 
 249. See Resolution Plans (Regulation QQ), 12 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2014).   
 250. 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(a)(4)(i); see also Jeffrey M. Lacker, Speech at the Global Society of 
Fellows Conference: Ending “Too Big to Fail” is Going to Be Hard Work (Apr. 9, 2013), available 
at http://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/president_jeff_lacker/2013/pdf/ 
lacker_speech_20130409.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ATN6-WQPT (“Because of the 
magnitude of the planning efforts required, . . . firms were asked for analysis under just one 
economic scenario . . . .”); Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions with $50 
Billion or More in Total Assets, 12 C.F.R. § 360.10 (2014): 
The FDIC recognizes the burden that the Rule imposes on [covered insured depository 
institutions (CIDIs)] and the challenge that CIDIs face in preparing their initial 
Resolution Plans. To reduce this burden, the FDIC is requiring that feasibility for 
initial Resolution Plans be assessed under only baseline economic condition scenarios. 
Subsequent Resolution Plans must assess feasibility under adverse and severely 
adverse economic condition scenarios as well. 
 251. Resolution Plan Required, 12 CFR § 243.3. 
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specific to the banking institution that does not affect the global 
markets generally; (3) the same hypothetical baseline assumptions 
from the Federal Reserve’s stress tests.252 
Critics have noted that the baseline assumptions provided by 
the regulators, specifically that a crisis would affect only the firm and 
no other market entities and that the government would not intervene, 
present a situation that looks nothing like the recent financial crisis. 
In the recent crisis, the reality was that “markets were not functioning 
normally, funding markets were closed to virtually all market 
participants, and the government came through with several hundred 
billion dollars of support.”253 However, in the initial round, the 
agencies asked for “streamlined requirements . . . ; for example, firms 
were asked for analysis under just one economic scenario, rather than 
three.”254 Because the living wills framework is still being developed, 
the initial plans “are akin to test cases that will help shape future 
standards and determine their effectiveness.”255 The bottom line is 
that these first drafts acted as little more than a “significant learning 
exercise” for both regulators and firms.256 
Compliance with the plans came with some regulatory “bite”: 
In the event that the FRB and the FDIC decide that a SIFI’s plan is 
“not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution of the 
company,” the firm must resubmit a plan within a time frame to be 
determined by the agencies.257 If the firm fails to resubmit a plan 
within the specified time, the agencies “may jointly impose more 
stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, or restrictions on 
the growth, activities, or operations of the company, or any subsidiary 
thereof, until such time as the company resubmits a plan that remedies 
the deficiencies.”258 If the firm does not adhere to regulatory demands 
to resolve deficiencies and resubmit a plan within two years, the 
 252. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, LIVING WILLS: KEY LESSONS FROM THE FIRST WAVE FOR 
SECOND AND THIRD WAVE FILERS (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.davispolk.com/ 
files/Publication/cbadd86a-3680-4305-bf10-f3ea147b57c3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
26191e6f-06dd-4d1b-ada8-f74a977be52e/ 071112_Living_Wills.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
AL25-J2X4. 
 253. Steve Schaefer, First Living Wills from JPMorgan, BofA, Goldman Don’t Tackle 2008-
Level Crisis, FORBES (July 3, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2012/ 
07/03/first-living-wills-from-jpmorgan-bofa-goldman-dont-tackle-2008-level-crisis/, archived at 
http: //perma.cc/YL9R-MT8C. 
 254. Lacker, supra note 250, at 4–5. 
 255. Joe Adler, Banks’ Living Wills Face First Critical Test, AM. BANKER (June 26, 2012, 2:35 
PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_122/banks-living-wills-face-first-critical-test-
1050397-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6TV3-Z7SW. 
 256. Id. 
 257. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(4)(B) (2012).  
 258. Id. § 5365(d)(5)(A).  
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agencies may require the firm “to divest certain assets or operations” 
that will facilitate an orderly resolution in case of failure.259 
b. Implementation 
On July 1, 2012, the first wave of banks filed their living wills. 
The FRB and FDIC received plans from Deutsche Bank, UBS, Morgan 
Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of New York Mellon, Bank of 
America, Credit Suisse, State Street, Citigroup, Barclays, and 
Goldman Sachs. The documents released to the public were summaries 
of longer reports provided to regulators.260 The banks drafted the living 
wills according to the baseline assumptions provided by regulators. 
Most of the plans included evidence of firm strength and hedging 
activities, such as using derivatives to deal with interest rate risks. 
Below are selected excerpts from bank resolution plans: 
 
? Deutsche Bank assumes that, following an idiosyncratic adverse 
event affecting only the firm, the German supervisory authority, 
BaFin, would produce a special purpose vehicle, or “bridge 
bank,” and that U.S. regulators would cooperate with the 
German regulators. The resolution plan also assumes that there 
will be third-party purchasers such as “foreign financial 
institutions, certain U.S. banks and non-bank financial 
institutions,” that are able to acquire Deutsche Bank’s U.S. 
businesses.261  
? UBS’s plan states that, in a recovery or resolution scenario, it 
would focus on the preservation of the potential value of any 
saleable core business lines pending a potential sale.262 
However, UBS noted that “[g]iven the size of the UBS Group’s 
operations, the range of potential purchasers is likely limited to 
large financial institutions.”263 
?  Morgan Stanley assumes that, in the event of failure, “potential 
purchasers could include a broad range of buyers including but 
not limited to global, national and regional financial 
 259. Id. § 5365(d)(5)(B). 
 260. Resolution Plans, FED. RESERVE, (July 23, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ X9G9-SCWY. 
 261. DEUTSCHE BANK, RESOLUTION PLAN (2013), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/ 
resplans/plans/deutschebank-165-1310.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3EEJ-5VYH. 
 262.  UBS AG, 2013 RESOLUTION PLAN 30 (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
bankinforeg/resolution-plans/ubs-1g-20131001.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/88W5-C3NS. 
 263. Id.  
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institutions, private equity and hedge funds, and other financial 
asset buyers such as insurance companies.”264 
? JPMorgan states, first, that it “has a fortress balance sheet and 
significant liquidity and earning power.”265 But that if it “were 
to default on its obligations or be in danger of default, and 
neither [its] recovery plan nor another private sector alternative 
were available to prevent the default, the Firm could be resolved 
under the provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.”266 In the 
firm’s view, its failure would not pose systemic risk to the U.S. 
financial system for a few reasons. One such reason is that the 
firm provides for recapitalization and continuation of the firm’s 
critical operations directly or through subsidiaries of a viable 
bridge entity. Additionally, where necessary, the firm provides 
for the divestiture or wind-down of the firm’s business with 
minimum disruption. Details are sparse, and the plan adds that 
JPMorgan “has provided the Federal Reserve with 
comprehensive confidential supervisory information and 
analyses” that are not included in the public portion of the 
plan.267 
?  BNY Mellon describes its orderly resolution and concludes with 
the assertion that “the Resolution Plan would result in no losses 
to the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund, to the United States 
Department of Treasury or to depositors.”268 
?  Bank of America’s resolution plan “contemplates a resolution 
strategy in which Bank of America’s U.S. bank material entities 
(‘MEs’), under a hypothetical failure scenario, would be resolved 
by placing them into FDIC receiverships.”269 Additionally, the 
plan provides that Bank of America’s assets would be sold to 
potential purchasers, such as private equity funds; hedge funds; 
national, international, and regional financial institutions; and 
other financial asset buyers.270 
 264.  MORGAN STANLEY, RESOLUTION PLAN 22–23 (2013), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/ 
reform/resplans/plans/morgan-165-1310.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XE6M-BLJL. 
 265.  J.P. MORGAN, CHASE & CO., RESOLUTION PLAN 28 (2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/jpmorgan-chase-1g-20131001.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ NA5M-989Z. 
 266.  Id. at 29. 
 267. Id.  
 268. BNY MELLON, RESOLUTION PLAN 24 (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg 
/resolution-plans/bk-ny-mellon-1g-20120702.pdf., archived at http://perma.cc/F92P-9EY6. 
 269.  BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, RESOLUTION PLAN 39, http://www.fdic.gov/ 
regulations/reform/resplans/plans/boa-1207.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ XWY8-4NP5. 
 270. Id.  
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?  Credit Suisse’s plan contemplates its resolution under U.S. 
operations or other applicable insolvency regimes. The plan 
considers the sale of Credit Suisse’s core business lines and 
potentially its franchise value, although the plan admits that 
“this strategy may prove challenging in the event of an extended 
period of stress.”271 The range of potential purchasers may 
include other broker dealers and banks as well as hedge funds.272 
? State Street’s resolution plan “contemplates strategies involving 
the failure of one or more State Street legal entities and include 
recapitalization strategies and sale strategies for each of State 
Street’s Core Business Lines, which State Street believes would 
be attractive acquisition targets.” 273 
? Citigroup first states that, with its “increased financial strength 
and liquidity, and its client-oriented business model, it is highly 
unlikely that a resolution of the company would ever be 
required.”274 The basic features of Citi’s resolution plan are: 
replacement of senior management and Board of Directors, 
recapitalization of CBNA by Citigroup the Parent holding 
company, wind-down, or sale.275 It also states that “based on its 
capital strength and asset quality . . . , Citi can be resolved 
without taxpayer support.”276 
?  Barclays’s plan considers a “broad range of buyers for Barclays” 
and that these potential buyers, such as national or 
international financial institutions, would have “sufficient 
capital.” Or “in the absence of a single purchaser, multiple 
acquirers could purchase certain material entities through stock 
acquisition and/or the purchase of certain assets which may 
include assumption of associated liabilities.”277 
 271. CREDIT SUISSE, CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION PLAN 14 (2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/credit-suisse-1g-20131001.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3RRW-9L2Z. 
 272.  Id. 
 273. STATE STREET CO. & STATE STREET BANK & TRUST CO., RESOLUTION PLAN 23 (2013), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/statestreet-idi-7114.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/MQ4X-U6BX.  
 274.  CITIGROUP INC. & CITIBANK, N.A., RESOLUTION PLAN 4 (2013), http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/citigroup-1g-20131001.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TFW7-KLAW. 
 275.  Id. at 28–29. 
 276. Id. at 29. 
 277. BARCLAYS, RESOLUTION PLAN 13–14 (2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
bankinforeg/resolution-plans/barclays-plc-1g-20120702.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X6V7-
9MME.  
1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/7/2014 12:15 PM
2014] REGULATION BY HYPOTHETICAL 1307 
?  Goldman Sachs’s resolution plan was the most thorough and 
self-reflective of the plans. The firm admits that “circumstances 
leading to the failure of a systemically important financial 
institution will likely be different than the specific assumptions 
[provided by the FDIC], and we expect that future submissions 
of our Resolution Plan will include other conditions and may 
have different assumptions.”278 The firm recognizes the 
integrated nature of international financial markets but 
believes that selling the assets of its material entities to one or 
multiple buyers postproceeding would avoid a firm-wide asset 
liquidation and is therefore likely to have a less disorderly 
impact on the market.279 “Any sale would need to be conducted 
quickly with the benefit of expedited and coordinated regulatory 
approvals to maintain the franchise value of the Firm.”280 
Goldman Sachs also states that “potential purchasers for the 
businesses or assets of our Material Entities and for other non-
Resolution Business Core Lines of Goldman Sachs could include 
global financial institutions, private equity funds, insurance 
companies or sovereign wealth funds.”281 
c. Analysis of Living Will Regime 
Although the living will requirement of Dodd-Frank is aimed at 
assisting in resolving the difficulties presented by large firms during 
the next financial crisis, most industry observers and regulators agree 
that living wills are unlikely to serve that purpose.282 Rather, living 
wills appear to be a hypothetical ex ante exercise that serve an 
informational, as opposed to an operational, function.283 These plans 
 278.  THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., SUMMARY OF RESOLUTION PLAN 314 (2012), 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/goldman-165-1207.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/ 4UXB-Z29L. 
 279.  Id. at 32. 
 280.  Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Brad Miller, Regulators, Demand Credible Living Wills Now—Not ‘Ultimately,’ AM. 
BANKER (Dec. 26, 2012, 12:00 PM) (“Simon Johnson, former chief economist for the International 
Monetary Fund, concluded . . . that the living wills process was ‘a sham, meaningless boilerplate 
and box checking.’ ”), http://www.americanbanker.com/ bankthink/regulators-must-demand-
credible-living-wills-now-not-ultimately-1055434-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FL8J-
WFAQ; Simon Johnson, The Myth of a Perfect Orderly Liquidation Authority for Big Banks, 
ECONOMIX (May 16, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/the-myth-of-
a-perfect-orderly-liquidation-authority-for-big-banks/, archived at http://perma.cc/UUG4-DCGG. 
 283.  In advising firms on the development of living wills, the Pew Research Center suggests 
the regular use of hypotheticals in developing resolution plans or living wills. PEW FINANCIAL 
REFORM PROJECT, STANDARDS FOR RAPID RESOLUTION PLANS (2011), http:// 
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are not legally binding, and very few people believe that they will 
actually be used to break up big banks.284 Former Congressman 
Barney Frank, one of the sponsors of the bill, even admitted that living 
wills are “probably not of use in a crisis, but they’re a useful pre-crisis 
tool.”285 Goldman Sachs states in its living will that a real crisis will 
likely not resemble the assumptions in their plan. Apparently, 
Goldman Sachs also “think[s] the whole assignment is busywork, and 
[is] not shy about saying so.”286 
Many of the plans state that using hypothetical scenarios is 
helpful for planning purposes.287 Given these stated purposes, living 
wills start to resemble stress tests in their methodology and 
underlying objectives. Officials are thus relying on living wills to 
provide information that would eventually result in targeted or 
“smart” regulation, such as requiring more capital, restructuring 
firms, or even breaking up the firms.288 In essence, living wills would 
be used as a fire drill to expose weaknesses in firms that could be 
remedied ex ante. So far, however, regulators have not assessed these 
fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/policy%20page/Standards%20for%20Rapid%20Resolution%20Plans.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/RWZ6-TNND. 
 284. Lawrence Baxter, a professor of law at Duke University, said: 
I think the heart of the problem is scale and interconnectedness. . . . I don't believe 
there are many people who think living wills and the orderly liquidation process are 
really going to work if one of those banks fails. . . . We manage that all the time with 
smaller banks . . . but once you get over the $100 billion range and into the $1 trillion 
range, it ceases to have any credibility. 
Victoria Finkle, Seven Reasons the Debate over ‘Too Big to Fail’ Is Here to Stay, AM. BANKER, Apr. 
2, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 7937747. Jaret Seiberg, a senior policy analyst at Guggenheim 
Securities’s Washington Research Group, stated, “At the end of the day, this isn’t going to become 
the hidden tool to break up JPMorgan and Bank of America. . . . To take that radical of a step, 
you’re going to need something more concrete than disputes over how credible a living will was 
written.” Jesse Hamilton, Big Banks Create Living Wills to Tell U.S. Regulators How to 
Dismember Their Corpses, FIN. POST (June 28, 2012), http:// 
business.financialpost.com/2012/06/28/big-banks-create-living-wills-to-tell-u-s-regulators-how-
to-dismember-their-corpses/, archived at http://perma.cc/TKW7-CX6V; Sloan, supra note 239; 
The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, supra note 239.  
 285.  Sloan, supra note 239. 
 286. Matt Levine, Banks Prove That They are Not Too Big to Fail By Saying “We Can Fail” 
on a Piece of Paper, Moving on, DEALBREAKER (July 5, 2012), http://dealbreaker.com/ 
2012/07/banks-prove-that-they-are-not-too-big-to-fail-by-saying-we-can-fail-on-a-piece-of-paper-
moving-on/, archived at http://perma.cc/ET2T-KCT6. 
 287. In its resolution plan, Barclays stated that “[u]sing a hypothetical resolution scenario, 
resolution plans spotlight areas where cooperation among regulatory authorities across 
jurisdictions is required in order to facilitate actual resolution of global financial institutions.” 
BARCLAYS, supra note 277, at 2. 
 288.  Jeffrey M. Lacker, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Speech at the University 
of Richmond: Ending ‘Too Big to Fail’ Is Going to Be Hard Work (Apr. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/president_jeff_lacker/2013/pdf/lacker_speech_
20130409.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X6N3-LTVH. 
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plans beyond a cursory review; in particular, living wills have not led 
to structural changes or capital infusions.289 But in theory, annual 
updates of living wills “will ensure that when a living will is needed, it 
accurately reflects a bank’s internal operations and risk profile.”290 
And requiring firms to review and draft living wills on a regular basis 
could at least “raise the bar on the quality of their risk information and 
management information systems, their risk and scenario analyses 
and their contingency planning, all of which may have benefits even in 
the absence of a crisis.”291 
In its resolution plan, Barclays noted that “[r]esolution plans 
can enable financial institutions, working in close conjunction with 
their regulators to assess their operations on a holistic level to 
determine whether there are appropriate operational changes that can 
be made to make institutions more resolvable in the event of 
failure.”292 According to Barclays, the living will should help by forcing 
them “to take mitigation actions to avoid failure and to reduce the 
contagion impact of an institution’s failure on the rest of the financial 
system” and by “putting processes in place to identify risk 
concentrations in advance, by developing capital or liquidity 
contingency plans that help stave off insolvency or illiquidity in the 
event of adverse market conditions.”293 
Thus, living wills, like stress tests, are an extension of the risk 
management regime into a hypothetical regime. Regulators will test 
internal risk management mechanisms through hypothetical future 
scenarios. They will then use the results of these tests, assuming they 
are performed rigorously, to design targeted, entity-specific regulation 
aimed at curing particular weaknesses highlighted by the tests. 
 289. Barbara A. Rehm, Regulators’ Reputation Sinks Along with Industry’s, AM. BANKER 
(Mar. 28, 2013, 12:57 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_60/regulators-
reputation-sinks-along-with-industry-s-1057876-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/K8U3-
ZSLK.  
 290. John F. Bovenzi, Another View: Why Banks Need ‘Living Wills,’ DEALBOOK (July 8, 2010, 
12:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/another-view-why-banks-need-living-
wills/?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/3T5N-YJYF; see also Olivia Schmid, Living Wills: Will 
They Fail to Remedy ‘Too Big to Fail’?, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 6, 9 (2012) (“[These 
streamlined institutions will] be easier for regulators to oversee and will help regulators identify, 
early enough, areas where a SIFI’s business strategies fall short of best practices.”). 
 291. DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL LLP & MCKINSEY & CO., CREDIBLE LIVING WILLS: THE FIRST 
GENERATION 2 (Apr. 25, 2011), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/ 
37a3a804-6a6c-4e10-a628-7a1dbbaece7c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c621815c-9413-
436b-91ea-3451b2b4cf32/042611_DavisPolkMcKinsey_LivingWills_Whitepaper.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/743E-J2ZL. 
 292.  BARCLAY’S, supra note 277, at 2. 
 293.  Id. 
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3. Weaknesses of Living Wills 
After the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, regulators 
required five of the largest oil companies to submit plans to deal with 
future hypothetical oil spills.294 The plans resembled living wills in 
many important ways. The firms were instructed to plan, in as much 
detail as possible, for a potential future disaster such as an oil spill.295 
As with living wills, many observers derided the oil companies’ plans 
as not credible. The House Energy and Commerce Committee 
Chairman, Henry Waxman, said that the “cookie-cutter” nature of the 
submissions revealed that “none of the five oil companies has an 
adequate response plan” for a serious oil spill.296 “When you look at the 
details, it becomes evident these plans are just paper exercises,” he 
added.297 At a hearing of the House Energy and Environment 
Subcommittee, Congressman Bart Stupak said, “Exxon and the other 
oil companies are just as unprepared to respond to a major oil spill in 
the gulf as BP.”298 
In the five-hundred-page plans, the firms tried to assure 
regulators “that they could handle oil spills much larger than the one 
now threatening [the Gulf of Mexico’s] environment and economy.”299 
However, the plans were lacking in important details and were wrong 
in obvious areas. For example, four of the plans included protections of 
walruses, sea lions, and seals, none of which are to be found in the Gulf 
of Mexico.300 In addition, Shell Oil Company noted that, in Alaska, “a 
larger crude oil spill would be unlikely because the water is shallow,” 
which was an untested and disputed assumption.301 Further, Shell 
claimed that if there were an oil spill, Alaska Clean Seas in Prudhoe 
Bay would be able to respond to any spill.302 However, “[t]he company 
is 250 to 350 miles away” from the area where Shell plans to drill, and 
“[i]n the event of a spill . . . , Alaska Clean Seas would be able to provide 
 294.  Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Lawmakers Attack Plans Oil Companies Had in Place 
to Deal with a Spill, WASH. POST (June 16, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/15/AR2010061501700.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q5Q5-
T9QG. 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.   Id. 
 300.   Id. 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  Id. 
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only a fraction of the resources BP called upon within the first 24 hours 
after the Deepwater Horizon explosion.”303 
A major problem with these disaster plans was that they were 
all written by “the same tiny Texas subcontractor,” a Houston-based 
firm with thirty-five employees.304 This firm “used common 
assumptions for different exploration wells.”305 Living wills for banks 
share this problem because they also are all drafted by the same law 
firm.306 Although this law firm is the most sophisticated shop in 
dealing with Dodd-Frank issues,307 it is still only one firm. Failure to 
subject living wills to a broader marketplace of ideas limits their 
utility. 
a. Not Credible—Unrealistic 
Contingency plans cannot be accurately tailored now to fit 
future crises for a number of reasons. First, it is difficult for firms to 
predict the extent of a crisis, particularly for large, multinational 
institutions that are subject to a multitude of domestic regulatory 
structures. Second, it is also hard for firms to anticipate “which parts 
of the firm will be under the greatest stress, what geographical regions 
may be affected most severely, and what the condition in various 
markets and economies will be, as well as the stability of 
counterparties and similarly situated institutions.”308 It is impossible 
to predict the financial landscape in a hypothetical future world. 
Third, firms will also be incapable of predicting the exact value 
of their subdivisions, subsidiaries, and assets in the event of market 
decline. They may also be unable to accurately identify potential 
buyers. In their resolution plans, most of the large banks, including 
Goldman Sachs, stated that they would be able to find numerous 
potential buyers for their assets, including “global financial 
institutions, private equity funds, insurance companies, or sovereign 
 303.  Id.  
 304.  Id. 
 305.  Id. 
 306. Id.; Matthew Huisman, Q&A: Davis Polk & Wardwell’s Annette Nazareth, LEGALTIMES 
(May 30, 2013), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/05/qa-davis-polk-wardwells-annette-
nazareth.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3T4N-4T7Z. 
 307. Julie Triedman, For Davis Polk, Dodd-Frank Pays, AM. LAW. (Dec. 2010), http:// 
www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/Articles//For.Davis.Polk.Dodd-Frank.Pays.AmLaw.dec10.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8JUW-46BD. 
 308. Governor Daniel K. Tarullo, Speech at the Symposium on Building the Financial System 
of the 21st Century: Toward an Effective Resolution Regime for Larger Financial Institutions 
(Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
tarullo20100318a.htm, archived at http:// perma.cc/ U99P-YZBK. 
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wealth funds.”309 However, Jim Millstein, the Treasury Department’s 
former chief restructuring officer, noted that “[t]here are few, if any, 
institutions with the balance sheet to support the purchase of one of 
these businesses in good times. . . . In a crisis . . . no one will be able to 
do it unless the FDIC supports the purchase with debt and equity 
financing,” a result he considers unlikely.310 “Therefore,” he said, 
“there is no credible way to break [these firms] up and sell them during 
a crisis.”311 In the event of a real crisis, many experts state that there 
will not be buyers available to absorb these assets312—that is, buyers 
other than the Federal Government. “When an institution fails, it 
usually happens suddenly and in an unpredictable way, and someone 
has to write a check.”313 
Lastly, SIFIs also do not have incentives to draw up credible 
plans. This is an area where firm management and regulators have 
opposing goals. Managers of these institutions “can be expected to seek 
to preserve as much value for shareholders as possible in its 
planning.”314 However, the “supervisors’ objective in a crisis is to 
achieve an orderly resolution, which will often entail winding down or 
restructuring the insolvent firm in ways that effectively wipe out 
shareholder interests.”315 
b. Regulatory Discretion 
Because living wills are not binding on firms or regulators, 
regulators exercise discretion in deciding whether to take living wills 
into account at all in wielding their supervisory powers.316 Although 
regulators have the authority to downsize and break up banks, they 
 309.  GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 278, at 32. 
 310.  Sloan, supra note 239. 
 311.  Id.  
 312.  Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 468 (2011). 
 313.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D. Schwartz, “Living Wills” for Too-Big-To-Fail 
Banks Are Released, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/business/ 
living-wills-of-how-to-unwind-big-banks-are-released.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ WNB2-
V4DD. 
 314.  Governor Daniel K. Tarullo, Speech at the Institute of International Bankers 
Conference on Cross-Border Insolvency Issues: Supervising and Resolving Large Financial 
Institutions (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
tarullo20091110a.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/XCU6-4BF9. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Levitin, supra note 312, at 468. Former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair noted that although 
“she think[s] [regulators] should use the authority [given to them in Dodd-Frank], . . . how they 
use it is going to be up to them.” Hamilton, supra note 284. 
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may not “have the guts to actually follow the will (and pronounce the 
death sentence that must precede it).”317 
Prior to filing the living wills, experts predicted that the initial 
wave would trigger a dialogue between the agencies and firms 
regarding the viability of the plans.318 However, by March 2013, 
observers noted that regulators had provided little feedback regarding 
the banks’ plans.319 William Dudley, the president of the Federal 
Reserve Bank in New York, admitted that “this initial exercise has 
confirmed that we are a long way from the desired situation in which 
large, complex firms could be allowed to go bankrupt without major 
disruptions to the financial system and large costs to society.”320 He 
added that “significant changes” would have to be made and that “we 
have only taken the first step in a long journey.”321 
In April 2013, the FRB and the FDIC granted a three-month 
extension to institutions that filed their living wills in 2012 so those 
institutions could devise another round of living wills.322 The agencies 
issued further instructions on what type of information should be 
included in living wills. Among other requirements, the agencies 
identified a set of obstacles that a firm may encounter during 
resolution.323 In their second set of plans, firms had to address how 
they will deal with multiple competing insolvencies in different 
jurisdictions, the problem of potential ring-fencing by foreign host 
authorities, the risk that third-party services might be interrupted, 
and the risk of insufficient liquidity.324 
 317. David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 129 (2010). 
 318. Adler, supra note 255.  
 319. Jesse Hamilton, FDIC Promises Big U.S. Banks a Helping Hand on Next Living Wills, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-05/fdic-promises-big-u-s-
banks-a-helping-hand-on-next-living-wills.html, archived at http://perma.cc/MF8D-397M (noting 
that banks “are not totally clear how they did in the opening round” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 320. President and CEO William C. Dudley, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the 
Clearing House’s Second Annual Business Meeting and Conference: Solving the Too Big To Fail 
Problem (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2012/ 
dud121115.html, archived at http:// perma.cc/YV8-ZQF8. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Agencies Provide Additional Instructions for 
Submission of Some Resolution Plans (Apr. 15, 2013), available at http://fdic.gov/news/news/ 
press/2013/pr13027.html?source=govdelivery, archived at http:// perma.cc/ 6MSC-MYMF. 
 323. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., GUIDANCE 
FOR 2013 § 165(d) ANNUAL RESOLUTION PLAN SUBMISSIONS BY DOMESTIC COVERED COMPANIES 
THAT SUBMITTED INITIAL RESOLUTION PLANS IN 2012 5, available at http://fdic.gov/ 
regulations/reform/domesticguidance.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NJ28-Y9LF. 
 324. Id. at 5–6. 
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The second round of plans were also not scrutinized by 
regulators and therefore will likely be of little use.325 The FDIC would 
like to dispel that illusion and give these plans some legitimacy. 
Martin Gruenberg, the Chairman of the FDIC, stated that the eleven 
banks in the first wave of filing “won’t have the safety net they had 
last year when they were told their plans wouldn’t be rejected if they 
weren’t credible.”326 James Wigand, the head of the FDIC’s Office of 
Complex Financial Institutions, echoed this sentiment, stating that 
the FDIC is prepared to consider exercising its authority to correct 
deficiencies in living wills.327 Wigand added that 2013 resolution plans 
“will be subject to informational completeness reviews and reviews for 
resolvability under the Bankruptcy Code” and to certain benchmarks 
for assessing a resolution. 328 
In August 2014, the FDIC and the FRB engaged the living wills 
for the first time by sending letters to 11 banks stating that their living 
will plans were “not credible.” The vice president of the FDIC, Thomas 
M. Hoenig said in a statement that “despite the thousands of pages of 
material these firms submitted, the plans provide no credible or clear 
path toward bankruptcy that doesn’t require unrealistic assumptions 
and direct or indirect public support.” Regulators have still not taken 
any action on the living wills.329 
Although regulators continue to emphasize that small steps are 
being taken towards forming a credible living wills framework, 
detractors have noted that “[t]he uncertainties in the financial system 
may not allow for year after year of polite suggestions by regulators 
and modest tweaks by institutions.”330 In the meantime, living wills 
impose high regulatory costs on SIFIs. Regulators estimate that a 
“credible” resolution plan may take up to 12,400 hours to complete, but 
a more complex institution may require much more preparation.331 
 325. Hamilton, supra note 319. 
 326. Id.  
 327. Id. 
 328. Improving Cross Border Resolution To Better Protect Taxpayers and the Economy: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Trade and Fin., U.S. Senate, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (statement of James R. Wigand, Director, Office of Complex Financial Institutions), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmay1513_2.html#_ftnref3, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QKK6-KDAR. 
 329. Peter Eavis, Federal Reserve and F.D.I.C. Fault Big Banks’ “Living Wills,” DEALBOOK 
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/federal-reserve-and-f-d-i-c-fault-big-
banks-living-wills/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, archived at http:// perma.cc/WJD3-Z5PV. 
 330. Miller, supra note 282.  
 331. Marcia L. Goldstein et al., Navigating Dodd-Frank’s Resolution Plan Requirement, N.Y. 
L.J., Dec. 5, 2011, at S4. 
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Furthermore, living wills must be updated within forty-five days of an 
event that may have a material effect on a firm’s business strategy.332 
c. Market Messages: Potemkin’s Village 
Early criticisms of living wills predicted that the regime would 
have a damaging effect on firms’ market ratings. Moody’s predicted 
that living wills “could potentially result in rating downgrades where 
ratings currently incorporate a high degree of government support.”333 
These downgrades would in turn increase the firms’ cost of funding.334 
However, once it became apparent that these living wills would not be 
scrutinized, the criticisms came to echo those of stress tests, with living 
wills derided as “simply an exercise to make people feel better.”335 
Barclays admits that “market awareness of the existence of living wills 
and the possibility of a resolution may increase confidence in 
systemically important financial institutions, in particular as a result 
of greater collaboration among supervisors.”336 
Critics also assert that living wills are simply “false hope” 
because “they were not prepared by the executives who would respond 
in the event of another financial crisis.”337 Instead, they are merely 
exercises done by lawyers and firm representatives in the context of a 
stable banking world.338 This is apparent in the living wills 
themselves. All of the plans begin by touting the strength of the firm 
with an overwhelmingly positive outlook. The plans show that the 
firms exceed capital requirements and have more than adequate 
funding available to them. Citigroup even noted that it “believes it is 
currently in compliance with the proposed Basel III [Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio], even though this requirement is not proposed to take 
effect until 2015” and states that it is unlikely that the firm will ever 
be in need of resolution.339 Much like Potemkin’s farcical villages built 
 332. 12 C.F.R. § 381.3(b)(2) (2014) (requiring resolution plans). 
 333. Jane Croft & Patrick Jenkins, Moody's Warns Over 'Living Wills', FIN. TIMES (Sept. 23, 
2009, 10:38 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/504a117a-a874-11de-9242-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2VCfnEXfe. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Silver-Greenberg & Schwartz, supra note 313.  
 336. See also Resolution Plans, supra note 260 (providing an overview of resolution plans); 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DODD-FRANK ACT TITLE 
I: LIVING WILLS OVERVIEW (2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2012/2012-01-
25_living-wills.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CGQ6-ADBV (providing an overview of living 
wills and the regulatory process). 
 337. Silver-Greenberg & Schwartz, supra note 313. 
 338. Hamilton, supra note 284. 
 339.  CITIGROUP INC. & CITIBANK, N.A., supra note 274. 
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to impress outsiders,340 living wills falsely portray the large banks that 
produce them as stable structures that could fail without causing 
major systemic disarray. 
Therefore, like the stress tests, living wills are used as positive 
market indicators to shore up confidence in the banking system. 
Instilling confidence in banking should not be overlooked as a 
regulatory aim. After all, governments support banks through deposit 
insurance and bail them out during crises because a banking system 
cannot survive without trust. When trust is gone, banks encounter 
runs and consequently fail. Therefore, regulators have crosscutting 
incentives: to assure safety and soundness in banking and to portray 
safety and soundness in banking. Because firms are still reeling from 
a crisis, and trust in the system is low, these two aims are likely to 
conflict and produce unholy results. Regulators, though they would 
like to rehabilitate the firms as soon as possible, are perhaps even more 
anxious than banks to shore up the public’s confidence, in large part 
because the latter tends to produce the former. 
d. Corporations Are People 
Like Greek tragedies, crises in financial firms are often stories 
of individual hubris. For example, Lehman Brothers’ failure was at 
least as much about CEO Richard Fuld’s mismanagement of the firm 
as about the failure of the subprime market.341 Similarly, Bear Stearns 
suffered at the hands of a disengaged CEO, Jim Cayne.342 Bank of 
America’s ill-advised purchase of Merrill Lynch has been explained as 
a Southern outsider’s (Ken Lewis’s) desire to “play with the big boys 
on Wall Street.”343 Michael Lewis described AIG Financial Products’ 
irresponsible and market-creating purchases of collateralized debt 
obligations from Wall Street as an arrogant, uninformed wager by AIG 
officer Joseph Cassano. Cassano has since been labeled “The Man Who 
  340.  Amy Tikkanen, Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE 
(Apr. 15, 2014) http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/472610/Grigory-Aleksandrovich-
Potemkin, archived at http://perma.cc/Z84J-TDGQ. 
 341.  Robert Lenzer, Wall Street Big Fish Stink from the Head Down, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2010, 
5:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/23/richard-fuld-jimmy-cayne-barack-obama-streettalk-
markets-lenzner.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3ZZF-BYD5. 
 342.  Roddy Boyd, Bear Stearns CEO Steps Down, CNN MONEY (Jan. 9, 2008, 10:16 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/08/news/companies/stearns_cayne.fortune/index.htm?postversion
=2008010819, archived at http://perma.cc/3945-DDFF. 
 343. Frontline: Breaking the Banks (PBS television broadcast June 30, 2009), available at 
http://video.pbs.org/video/1168339502/. 
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Crashed the World.”344 Going back to previous disasters, Enron failed 
because of the dishonesty and conceit of “The Smartest Guys in the 
Room”—Enron CEOs Kenneth Lay and Jeffery Skilling.345 
All this to say that financial crises are not just about failures of 
balance sheets in the face of severely adverse market scenarios, but 
about men and women (but mostly men) who unwittingly build houses 
upon sand. And there will always be tales of mismanagement and 
miscalculation so long as humans are involved in the markets. How 
can regulators take account of the risks and problems that involve 
individual decisionmakers? This question is central to the entire 
regulatory regime and too complex and multifaceted to answer in these 
pages. However, it is clear that the stress tests and the living wills—
indeed, the entire risk management complex—appear to be leaving 
human decisionmaking out of their models, perhaps because there is 
no adequate way to design models to account for human choice. To be 
sure, the models are meant to reflect and inform human choice, but the 
hypothetical regime, so focused on future scenarios, cannot take into 
account how managers of balance sheets will respond to diverse 
scenarios. 
For example, if the stock market suddenly rises or falls, will a 
fund manager sell, buy, short, or hedge in a particular market? And 
will she use the opportunity to double down on risk, hoping for a big 
reward? Or will she accept modest losses in order to prevent what 
might be a greater loss to come? Stress tests and living wills are not 
designed to answer these questions—nor do they pretend to. The FRB 
stated that the models “do not make explicit behavioral assumptions 
about the possible actions of a BHC’s creditors and 
counterparties . . . .”346 
 344. Armen Keteyian, AIG’s Joseph Cassano Refuses to Play Fall Guy, CBS NEWS (June 30, 
2010, 8:09 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/aigs-joseph-cassano-refuses-to-play-fall-guy/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/83H3-XVP6.  
 345.  A. O. Scott, Those You Love to Hate: A Look at the Mighty Laid Low, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
22, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/22/movies/22enro.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
E3JV-CZYH (reviewing Alex Gibney’s documentary ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE 
ROOM(Magnolia Pictures 2005)). 
 346. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf; archived at http://perma.cc/ 4UQD-VBFP. Cass Sunstein 
highlights the phenomenon of behavioral biases in a theory called bounded rationality, which 
describes cognitive biases that overvalue some risks, undervalue others, and lead to irrational 
decision making. Cass Sunstein et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1471 (1998). These limits have been used to explain shortcomings in regulation in a 
variety of contexts, including workplace discrimination and personal decision making. Id.; see 
also Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and 
the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31 (2008) (analyzing the modern debate over nuclear 
1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/7/2014 12:15 PM
1318 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:5:1247 
There are two ways to deal with these shortcomings: (1) 
recognize them and abandon the hypothetical regime based on the 
conclusion that unreliable data and indicators are worse than none at 
all, or (2) attempt to remedy them by accounting for human behavior 
in the hypothetical scenarios. Above, I made the case that regulation 
by hypothetical in its current form is a flawed framework that should 
be abandoned. Others have also discredited the risk management 
regime, of which stress testing and living wills are an outgrowth.347 
The banking sector is riddled with unmanageable risks that cannot be 
adequately controlled. The hypothetical regime therefore offers false 
confidence. 
Stepping away from the risk management regime would lead to 
some clear remedies that are politically charged and difficult to 
enforce. For example, many agree that breaking up the largest banks 
would limit the banks’ power and the effects of their failure and end 
TBTF.348 Enforcing a large capital or equity buffer would also reduce 
systemic risk by changing incentives and allowing absorption of more 
risk for longer periods of time, allowing firms to withstand crises. In 
addition, enforcing activity restrictions that separate traditional 
banking from more risky ventures could contain risks to fewer 
products and institutions and reduce contagion. These proposals 
should be seriously considered by policymakers, but they are outside 
the scope of this article. 
However, if regulators are to press forward with regulation by 
hypothetical, the hypothetical needs to account for human behavior. 
The following Part suggests that financial war games are an important 
way to increase the utility of hypothetical regulation.349 
power in light of public cognitive biases). Experts in this field have not yet had much to say about 
financial decision making because it has been opaque and not subject to review.  
 347. See Haldane, supra note 5. 
 348.  See, e.g., Simon Johnson, Break up the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2014, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/01/12/are-big-banks-out-of-control/break-up-the-
big-banks, archived at http://perma.cc/ALK7-A2RY. 
 349. Other articles have referred to financial war games in passing, but without any detail 
besides mentioning it as a possibility. See e.g., Weber, supra note 17, at 2263–66; Marco Sorge, 
Stress-testing Financial Systems: An Overview of Current Methodologies 18–20 (Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, Working Paper No. 165, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work165.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/KZM6-ZARL (“Some papers have modeled endogenous trading 
decisions . . . . Further research should attempt to lengthen the time horizon and to extend the 
analysis from trading strategies to lending strategies, thus integrating the assessment of 
feedback effects for both market and credit risks.”). 
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IV. FINANCIAL WAR GAMES 
The military has used war games for many years, both as a test 
of the military’s responsiveness to crises and as a way to devise 
military strategies.350 If we are to test firms against hypothetical 
scenarios, it is crucial that regulators gauge not only the ability of 
balance sheets to withstand distress but also the likely behavior of 
managers and others when faced with unanticipated stresses. 
Properly conducted financial war games would test firm 
management and balance sheets as well as regulatory response in the 
context of crisis management. Note the inclusion of both market 
participants and regulators. Because the reaction to a financial crisis 
is inherently a regulatory affair, a hypothesis tested against only the 
market participants—as is currently the case under regulation by 
hypothetical—tells only a partial story. This Part introduces the 
concept of financial war games, drawing parallels to simulated crisis 
management used elsewhere in government. It then discusses features 
of financial war games that would be peculiar to banking and financial 
regulation, including issues such as game design and administration, 
as well as limitations on the information gained from the exercises. 
A. The Theory of War Games 
The concept of war games—or war simulations, as the military 
refers to the exercise—has been practiced for centuries. Indeed, 
historians claim that the Persians invented the game of chess as an 
early war simulation.351 Currently, war simulations involve tools that 
range from pure computer modeling to fully staged military ground 
exercises. Since the 1950s, the U.S. Department of Defense has created 
and used a variety of simulations,352 including computerized war 
 350. Nicholas Schmidle, Getting bin Laden, NEW YORKER (Aug. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/ 110808fa_fact_schmidle, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/6949-7U8E (last visited Aug. 11, 2014); FAQ’s, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, 
https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/War-Gaming/Documents/About-Us/FAQ-s.aspx, 
archived at http://perma.cc/DQ8X-RD7K. 
 351. History of Chess, TRADEGAMES.ORG, http://www.tradgames.org.uk/games/Chess.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/RXL9-6FJH (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
 352.  According to the U.S. Department of Defense, a war game is “a simulation, by whatever 
means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and 
procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.” DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT 
PUBLICATION 1-02: DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS (2014), available at FAQ’s, 
supra note 350.  
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games as well as “networked, multiplayer simulations.”353 Today, 
military simulations include “immersive virtual-reality training 
environments, and complex tactical team trainers comprising multiple 
sites each replicating the physical environment of one or more military 
platforms.”354 
In The Art of Wargaming, Peter Perla defined a war game as: 
a warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of actual 
military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, affected by the 
decisions made by players representing the opposing sides. In the end, a wargame is an 
exercise in human interaction, and the simulated outcomes of those decisions make it 
impossible for two games to be the same. . . . Its forte is the exploration of the role and 
potential effects of human decisions.355 
Experts state that effective military war games must be made up of 
several elements. First, war games must simulate the “conflictual 
nature of war.”356 In other words, a war game forces an institution to 
face an opponent with plans contrary to its own. This exposes 
uncertainties and risks in the institution’s assumptions.357 Second, 
war games must recognize that chance plays a prominent role in many 
decisions and outcomes. For example, the Union Army under George 
McClellan lost track of Robert E. Lee’s Confederate forces and would 
not have found them but for the “accidental discovery of a copy of Lee’s 
plans, which were found in a cigar box” by troops foraging in a deserted 
Confederate camp.358 Thus, human luck changed the outcome of a 
critical campaign and perhaps the war.359 But war games can 
aggregate the thousands of decisions by individuals at every stage in 
an action to accurately depict the way myriads of mundane decisions 
can have significance over time.360 By taking chance events and 
uncertainties seriously, “military users of war games have been using 
chance or Monte Carlo gaming techniques to determine combat results 
 353.  Carrie McLeroy, History of Military Gaming, SOLDIERS MAG., Sept. 2008, at 4; available 
at http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/rv5_other/soldiers/archives/pdfs/sep08all.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/X9B3-DB2V.  
 354.  Jason E. Summers, Simulation-Based Military Training: An Engineering Approach To 
Better Addressing Competing Environmental, Fiscal, and Security Concerns, J. WASH. ACAD. SCI., 
Spring 2012, at 9, 12, available at http://www.washacadsci.org/Journal/ Journalarticles/V.98-1-
simulation_based_military_training_jSummers.pdf, archived at http:// perma.cc/XG73-2W92. 
 355.  PETER PERLA, THE ART OF WARGAMING 164 (1990).  
 356.  Stephen P. Glick & L. Ian Charters, War, Games, and Military History, 18 J. CONTEMP. 
HIST. 567, 573–74 (1983).  
 357.  Id. at 573. 
 358.  Id. at 574. 
 359.  Id. 
 360.  Id. 
1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/7/2014 12:15 PM
2014] REGULATION BY HYPOTHETICAL 1321 
for nearly as long as they have been employing war games.”361 The 
third critical element of an effective war game is to replicate the “fog 
of war,” a condition that results from high levels of chance and 
uncertainty in military combat.362 
Of course, the more involved and complex the simulation, the 
higher the cost and the higher the informational value. For example, 
before the Navy SEALs operation that captured Osama bin Laden in 
Pakistan, the SEALs practiced the maneuver many times in the 
United States.363 The military did its best to replicate the Pakistani 
compound housing bin Laden, casting various players in realistic 
simulations to determine, ex ante, potential problems the SEALs 
would face during the actual attack.364 The war gaming proved useful 
training for the troops. However, there was one major hitch in the 
operation: one helicopter was grounded because of a centripetal air 
suction. This grounding occurred because, when reconstructing the 
compound in the U.S., the military surrounded it with a chain link 
fence. In reality, the compound was surrounded by walls. This 
discrepancy created different landing conditions in practice than the 
helicopters faced in reality. Had the military created an exact replica, 
that problem could have been avoided. 
The key point is this: the closer one comes to simulating an 
actual scenario, the less likely it is that unanticipated situations will 
derail a plan of action. However, it is very costly to simulate all possible 
contingencies. Real war simulations, then, are used for the most high-
stakes operations. While financial war games would not require the 
amount of expensive weaponry and human power that true war 
gaming requires, creating realistic financial simulations is more costly 
than merely running computer models. Even so, given the dangers that 
failed financial institutions would pose to the world economy, 
conducting some high-stakes simulations may well be worth the cost. 
B. Financial War Games 
Conducting financial war games is not without precedent. In 
March of 2009, the Pentagon hosted a two-day financial war game 
event at the Warfare Analysis Laboratory in Laurel, Maryland, a 
 361.  Glick and Charters define Monte Carlo as “the determination of outcomes on a random 
basis through such means as dice, roulette wheels, etc.” Id. at 569, 581. 
 362.  Id. at 576.  
 363.  Schmidle, supra note 350.  
 364.  See id. 
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facility that is used for conducting military war games.365 However, 
these war games focused on national security, not on financial 
stability.366 The military was concerned about global financial 
problems because of their “real world consequences, including failed 
states.”367 Bankers and hedge fund managers, among others, were 
invited to the Pentagon to role-play a financial disaster.368 Paul 
Bracken, a professor at the Yale School of Management and expert in 
private equity, attended the sessions. He stated that the exercise “was 
an example of the changing nature of conflict . . . . The purpose of the 
game is not really to predict the future, but to discover the issues you 
need to be thinking about.”369 
Although financial regulators have not yet conducted any war 
game scenarios, Deloitte, a private consulting firm, has offered to 
conduct war game scenarios for its financial institution clients.370 In 
2010, Deloitte acquired Simulstrat, a spinoff from the Department of 
War Studies at King’s College London and a pioneer in war gaming for 
public and private sector organizations.371 Deloitte suggests that its 
clients use war games to strengthen and expose the flaws in their 
internal stress testing and their Dodd-Frank mandated living wills.372 
However, the object of these war games is not to control for risks or 
even test balance sheets. They are primarily used to inform firm 
structure or to create protocols for their crisis-management 
employees.373 
Conducting war games would certainly benefit individual firms 
as the exercise allows firms to assess the scope of vulnerabilities, the 
strength of their contingency plans, and their general risk profiles. 
However, to measure systemic risk, regulators need more than just 
firm-specific information. Regulators need to measure risks across 
 365.  Eamon Javers, Pentagon Preps for Economic Warfare, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2009, 4:18 AM), 
available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0409/21053.html, archived at http:// perma.cc/ 
PK6K-24BH. 
 366.  JAMES RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS: THE MAKING OF THE NEXT GLOBAL CRISIS 3–16 
(2012). 
 367.  Javers, supra note 365. 
 368.  Id. 
 369.  Id. 
 370.  DELOITTE, THIS IS NOT A TEST: HOW SIMULATIONS AND WARGAMING CAN HELP YOU 
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firms and understand how one firm’s vulnerabilities can affect the 
system. For example, the possible failure of the insurer AIG, which 
was not overseen by any banking regulators, threatened to collapse the 
entire financial system because AIG had insured trillions of 
derivatives for almost every large financial institution.374 Regulators 
must be able to see the system as a whole to understand what risks 
threaten it. Similarly, when the military conducts a war game of a 
potential Syrian strike, they must include players representing 
Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and Israeli interests to fully understand 
and prepare for each nation’s potential response to an attack and 
prepare for all those contingencies. 
If regulators are committed to using hypotheticals to inform 
their efforts, they must ensure that the results account for all 
variables, especially human decisionmaking. Financial war games are 
one way to do so. What would such an exercise look like? Borrowing 
from the Pentagon’s playbook, regulators would invite experts in the 
field to assume a role in the financial sector. The regulators would then 
model a financial stressor or firm failure, and each party would react 
to protect their own interests. The resulting data would be aggregated 
to provide an accurate understanding of the vulnerabilities of the 
system as a whole and each individual firm. 
The players could be representatives from the actual firms or 
industry experts who could vicariously play their roles. (Ratings 
agencies, insurers, and regulators should also play a role.) Both choices 
have advantages and flaws: using experts, and not firm insiders, 
minimizes the risk of insiders trying to game the game. In other words, 
insiders with reputations to protect might behave in a more altruistic 
manner than they would behave in a real world situation. For example, 
in the event of counterparty failure, a firm might engage in 
opportunistic behavior that would accelerate a counterparty’s failure 
or cause damage to other firms. But the insiders might not display this 
sort of behavior in a low-stakes simulation. In contrast, experts who 
are not repeat market players and have no reputational concerns 
would take actions that actually reflect those made in real crises. The 
downside of outside experts, however, is that they are unable to mimic 
or portray the culture of a firm, and as stated above, culture has a lot 
to do with how decisions are made. 
 374.  Gregory Gethard, Falling Giant: A Case Study of AIG, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/american-investment-group-aig-bailout.asp, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BX6V-T6FB. 
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C. Challenges of Financial War Games 
The principal challenge to financial war gaming is that even a 
realistic war game simulation needs to use hypothetical situations 
based on historical data to determine risk exposure. As illustrated 
above, hypothetical models of any sort have serious and irremediable 
structural flaws. Carefully conducted war games have the potential to 
produce more, and more accurate, information than a balance sheet–
based stress test, but they do not cure the faulty assumptions of the 
hypothetical regime.375 For example, a war game needs prompts and 
assumptions—or stress. And in devising prompts, regulators would 
still be using yesterday’s crisis to imagine the future and would be just 
as unaware of black swans or unprecedented events with catastrophic 
market consequences. 
Furthermore, the simulations would be susceptible to 
gamesmanship by the players and might not accurately reflect firm 
response to financial stressors. Just as regulators’ incentives to instill 
trust in the financial system might lead them to administer “soft” 
stress tests, so might a firm trying to instill confidence in their 
creditors, counterparties, and supervisors depict a rosier picture than 
is accurate. In addition to the problems with war games’ effectiveness, 
they are also more costly to administer than stress tests. In addition 
to the expense associated with the creation and administration of 
hypothetical models, which is where stress tests stop, war games 
involve more human power—namely, more experts and industry 
insiders. However, these costs can easily be justified if they can help 
prevent firm failure. In addition, if war games exposed more (and more 
severe) firm weaknesses than stress testing, they would be more useful 
in designing future regulation. However, unfortunately, war games 
would thwart the FRB’s market-calming objectives. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As banking has changed over the last century, regulators 
responded using a variety of regulatory tools to protect the safety of 
the banking system. Before the era of banking deregulation, regulators 
used bright-line rules and restrictions. These restrictions could not 
survive the transformation of banking that occurred during the 1970s 
and1980s. The financial world grew larger and more complex, and 
 375.  War games are not just another version of hypothetical scenarios. FRANK PARTNOY, 
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regulators met these changes with more market- and industry-driven 
regulation. Many argued that activity restrictions and geographic 
restrictions prohibited banks from competing in the modern financial 
world. Regulators needed to find a way to ensure safety while allowing 
banks to stay competitive. Thus, the disclosure, capital, and risk 
management regimes were born. The disclosure regime was based on 
the theory that, if banks shared enough information with the market, 
the market would discipline excessive risk taking or mismanagement. 
The capital regime was thought of as a way to incentivize banks to 
decrease risk by putting more of their own equity on the line and 
provide a buffer in the event of failure. The risk management regime 
was an industry-led effort to account for risk in a complex and fast-
changing market. Banks used the tools of risk management to estimate 
their vulnerabilities. Regulators oversaw the creation and 
administration of these models but mainly relied on bankers 
themselves to design and implement these internal programs. 
The recent financial crisis made clear that the current menu of 
modern regulation had failed. The disclosure system did not work 
because the market was unable to account for the actual risks, and 
rating agencies and other monitors of information were unable to 
synthesize the information the banks were disclosing. Capital 
requirements came up short under conditions that caused a rapid 
depletion of capital across the entire financial sector. And risk models 
had not accounted for unprecedented or “black swan” events, such as a 
steep nationwide decline in housing prices. In the wake of these events, 
many commentators have demanded more capital, more disclosure, 
and better risk management to improve regulatory oversight. 
This Article highlights a new strain of financial regulation 
introduced by Dodd-Frank: regulation by hypothetical. Two of Dodd-
Frank’s pillars—stress tests and living wills—use hypothetical future 
scenarios to test firms’ current positions. The FRB creates these 
hypotheticals using historical data and tests firms’ current balance 
sheets in light of possible adverse scenarios. The new hypothetical 
regime is an extension of the risk management regime, but differs from 
risk management because regulation by hypothetical is designed and 
implemented by regulators and the hypothetical test results are used 
to inform formal regulatory responses. 
The hypothetical regime, as currently practiced, suffers from 
several problems. If these problems are left unremedied, they will pose 
grave dangers to market stability. Like the tools of the risk 
management regime, the testing mechanisms of regulation by 
hypothetical will fail if they remain focused on historical data and 
events. In addition, these mechanisms, as now conceived, test a static 
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balance sheet but not a firm’s dynamic response. Not only is it unlikely 
that currently employed tests can accurately diagnose a firm’s 
vulnerability to future events, but it is also likely that these tests cause 
affirmative harms. In particular, they may signal to the public a 
greater measure of financial-sector stability than exists in reality. This 
result, which in effect embodies a form of government subsidy to the 
banking industry, is especially troubling in light of the many subsidies 
that the industry already receives. 
The bottom line is that these tests must be either abandoned as 
a regulatory tool or significantly enhanced. One way to pursue the 
latter course of action is for regulators to design financial war games. 
Such an exercise would allow regulators to test not just firms’ balance 
sheets but also the firms’ responses to potential disasters. Henry 
Paulson described the quickly unfolding financial crisis of 2008 as “the 
financial equivalent of a war,”376 and certainly it thrust the banking 
industry into the financial equivalent of the “fog of war.” The next 
crisis will likely unfold like a war as well. Thus, regulators should plan 
accordingly. 
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